Tallying the Oil Reserves

How Canada made it to number three in the world

This article appears in the April issue of Oilsands Review

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
The issue of how much recoverable oil is in the ground in Canada has been a matter of political and commercial interest since the first surveys undertaken by the Geological Survey of Canada in the 1870s.

American eyes were opened to the true potential in April 2003 at a hearing of the U.S. Senate’s foreign relations committee. Convened to examine international energy security, the committee learned that Canada was an energy superpower. Alberta’s energy regulator had changed its method of calculating oilsands reserves, with the result that booked reserves in Canada suddenly rose from 5 billion to 180 billion barrels.

Canada suddenly stood in second place worldwide after Saudi Arabia. The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) has since moved Canada into third place by accepting a calculation of Venezuela’s vast extra-heavy crude oil reserves which puts that country at the head of the pack.

No one knows what happened to the eyes of Canadian senators when they heard the first credible estimate of how much oil was in place in the Athabasca area, at a hearing that took place in 1888. The senators were provided with an estimate from R.G. McConnell of the Geological and Natural Survey of Canada.

McConnell’s calculation came from assumptions based on field and lab work: first, there were at least 1,000 square miles of bitumen-saturated sand in the area; second, the sands were 150 to 225 feet thick; third, and this result came from laboratory tests that involved boiling oilsand samples, that the bitumen content averaged 12 per cent by weight. Therefore there were about 30 million “long tons” of bitumen in place—roughly speaking, 220 million barrels. McConnell’s estimate was short by orders of magnitude; to put it in perspective, Canada now consumes about 200 million barrels every three months.

McConnell’s number was an estimate of resources in place, of course, and not a reserves estimate. At that time the very concept of reserves – hydrocarbons that are economically producible at current prices using current technology – was unknown. No one had any idea how to calculate what percentage of oil in the ground would ever see the inside of a pipeline.

Bedevilled engineers
Petroleum engineering gradually emerged as a profession, and engineers soon figured out how to book reserves from conventional oil and gas reservoirs. However, how to calculate oilsands reserves was an issue that bedevilled engineers and geologists for many decades. This led to some curious anomalies.

For example, when the $235 million, 45,000 barrel per day Great Canadian Oil Sands (now Suncor Energy Inc.) plant went on stream in 1967, it represented a substantial investment for the company and soon became a significant contributor to Canadian oil supply. The Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA-now CAPP) booked 6.3 billion barrels of oilsands reserves in its authoritative Statistical Handbook when the project went on stream, but reduced that number to about 1.5 billion in 1975. And when the 140,000 barrel per day, $2.3 billion Syncrude plant went on stream in 1978, the situation became even more absurd: the association didn’t add any new reserves. It was as though the oil was appearing out of nowhere. By the early 1980s a growing number of in situ projects, including Imperial’s Cold Lake activities, made the situation untenable.

According to Hans Maciej, retired vice president of the CPA, in the early 1980s he asked the group’s reserves committee, “‘Where the hell is [the oil] coming from?’ That was quite the discussion,” he recalls.

The committee eventually agreed that they had a problem, but there further endless questions about how to resolve it. “One thing was very easy,” says Maciej. “We could put whatever Great Canadian Oil Sands produced, let’s say it produced a million barrels that year and just add it to reserves – you know, wipe it out. Well that didn’t go very far. [However], after lengthy discussions we decided that we would credit every producing project, and every project that had approval and was sort of certain to go ahead. There was some judgment involved, but we said we would [book their reserves at] 25 times their annual production.” Maciej adds, “This was a very conservative estimate, [but] just to get things going we finally agreed on 25 years.”

CAPP’s reserves committee relies heavily on data provided by its member companies, and the association laboured mightily to stay on top of the country’s burgeoning oilsands reserves, which with special speed during the last 15 years as Syncrude and Suncor expanded, new mines came on stream and in situ projects multiplied.

However, according to CAPP’s research manager, Steve Rodrigues, it became increasingly difficult to get the necessary data from oilsands producers in the last decade – “not because of concerns about revealing competitive information, but because companies increasingly felt that they were not adding value by generating this information.”

One result was that CAPP’s calculation of oilsands reserves – historically, the Canadian standard – now compared to those being calculated by provincial and federal regulators. The numbers presented to the U.S. Senate’s foreign affairs committee were, after all, government numbers, and they were 24 times greater than CAPP’s.

Throwing in the towel
Where did the regulators get their numbers? In a recent presentation, Neil McCrank, who served as chair of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board until 2007, offered the background. The “new focus on in situ development created a need for the regulators to find new ways of assessing and monitoring these projects…one of the major contributions made by the [regulator] was to recognize the need to re-categorize the in situ bitumen ‘resource’ to a ‘reserve’ where it was proven on the ‘core and cuttings’ analysis to be commercially viable with current technology.”

Bob Taylor, who was then Alberta’s assistant deputy minister for oil development, stresses that the Department of Energy does not play a role in these discussions. However, he says, the information used to recalculate reserves would have been rigorous and the models used would have been mathematically challenging.

“Every leaseholder is obligated to go out and prove up a resource on the basis of one well per section, or the equivalent of one well per section plus some seismic, so it might be one well every couple of sections with seismic lines connecting them so that you can get the stratigraphy. So what [the regulator] did was to have geologists look at each company’s assets,” while examining proven technologies and likely future demand. Using all this information, they created models that could generate highly credible reserves calculations.

Such was the origin of the proved reserves that caused so much excitement in Washington in 2003. According to the McCrank, the announcement of more than 173 billion barrels of oilsands reserves “was initially criticized, but after a stout defence of its scientific approach… the international oil and gas community accepted these reserves calculations.”

So did CAPP. In 2010 the organization threw in the towel as far as using its own method of calculation was concerned. An organization that has celebrated its independence from government since its earliest predecessor was formed in 1927 began using numbers from both Alberta and federal regulators as the basis for calculating oilsands reserves.

The association’s in situ oilsands reserves suddenly jumped by around 2,000 per cent, while its mineable reserves more than tripled. Canada’s industry had caught up with its regulators, and the results were parabolic.

Of course, reserves estimates will never be unanimous. The most widely accepted global authority on energy numbers, BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, most recently puts Canadian oil reserves at 33 billion barrels, or tenth place. Venezuela at 175 billion stood in second place, while Saudi Arabia is the top dog at 264 billion.

We’ve come a long way since 1888, but we still have a way to go.

This article is part of a  series which reflects information from the Petroleum History Society’s current Oil Sands Oral History Project, which is recording the stories of oilsands pioneers in their own words. As with its previous oral history projects, transcripts and recordings will reside in Calgary’s Glenbow Archives. Peter McKenzie-Brown is part of the team of researchers/writers behind the project.

Where to Go?

Some say transportation should be a market grail for natural gas, while others aren't so sure

This article appears in the second volume of CSUG's Energy Evolution Guidebook & Directory

By Peter McKenzie Brown
In his best-selling 1958 book The Affluent Society, Canadian-born economist John Kenneth Galbraith popularized the concept of conventional wisdom. “It will be convenient to have a name for the ideas which are esteemed at any time for their acceptability, and it should be a term that emphasizes this predictability,” he wrote. “I shall refer to these ideas henceforth as the conventional wisdom.” The problem with conventional wisdom is that it isn’t always true. Contrarians are often right.

Price Bull
It’s worth keeping that truism in mind as we develop the case for building new natural gas markets in North America. In a recent comment, author and analyst Peter Tertzakian argued that the rapid decline in drilling for natural gas across North America raises the question of whether natural gas is likely to continue to be in a serious state of oversupply. Tertzakian notes that for the first time in 15 years half of the US drilling fleet is drilling for oil, compared to less than 20% of rigs for the last decade. Such a dramatic decline in drilling almost certainly suggests that production levels will decline, he suggests.

He then moves on to the killer argument: “Let’s say (gas) production starts retreating in earnest this year and natural gas prices rise back to some fictional level like six dollars per MCF. Notionally, the (conventional) wisdom goes that producers will dispatch more rigs to ramp up production and thus clobber prices again. There is a problem with this line of thinking: why would producers do that when more money is to be made elsewhere?” He suggests that as long as oil is valued at more than four times the value of gas (energy equivalency basis), there is little motivation for the industry to shift toward more gas drilling. The result? Declining supply and still higher gas prices until a cost-reward rebalance restores aggressive natural gas drilling.

Supply Bull
Since Tertzakian is such an unusual voice in the wilderness, the balance of this article assumes that the conventional wisdom is true. Gas supplies are likely to continue to be plentiful, and there will continue to be a need to develop new markets. One of the most interesting advocates of greater markets is the legendary oilman T. Boone Pickens, who says he has invested $70 million in developing and promoting The Pickens Plan.

An 83-year-old geologist who received his degree in geology in 1951, as a young man the Texas-born Pickens spent a decade in Calgary. In a broadcast interview, he said he opened an office in Calgary in 1959, and lived in the province with his family in the 1960s. After moving back to the United States, he made a multibillion-dollar fortune in exploration and development and, much more publicly, as a corporate raider. His current passion is to promote the Pickens Plan.

“For 40 years the United States has had no energy plan,” he explained. “We’ve just been drifting. Just drifting means you are just importing more oil from the Middle East, countries that the state department recommends we not visit.”

Pickens is adamant that the United States should reduce its dependency on overseas oil, and he believes that renewables like wind and solar aren’t viable anymore because of cheap gas.

“Natural gas is the only thing we have that can replace non-North American foreign oil. We import 5 million barrels from the Mid East. That’s the oil I want to replace with gas. If you had 8 million 18-wheelers (in the US trucking fleet fuelled with natural gas), that would cut OPEC imports in half.” He added, “If the US administration announced that from now on all new government vehicles would use domestic fuel that would be a powerful message to send to the world.”

“This is a security issue for me. I don’t want to be dependent on the enemy for energy,” he said. Until gas prices cratered, Pickens was a strong advocate of wind energy, and he was leading an effort to finance a multi-billion dollar wind farm in the Texas Panhandle. He uses this fact to support his green credentials. “Natural gas is 30% cleaner than diesel. We have the cleaner, cheaper, abundant fuel here, and it will replace the dirty fuel from the Mid-East.”

Pickens is also an advocate of continental fuel switching – in particular, substituting natural gas for coal in power generation facilities.

For many years most commentators have believed that the United States could never become self-sufficient in energy, Pickens said, but “things have changed. We have so much natural gas – the US has a 100 years supply, and the Canadians have a lot up in Horn River, for example, and the Canadians have a lot of oilsands (oil). Let’s use that to make North America energy self-sufficient.” He added, “When people say to me, ‘Hey, Pickens, I don’t like your plan!’ I say ‘Fine, what’s your plan? If you don’t have a plan your plan is to import more oil from the Middle East.’”

Not many oilmen are as colourful as T. Boone Pickens or as motivated by worries about enemies in the Middle East. However, there are a lot of other natural gas supply bulls.

Exxon-Mobil, for example, demonstrated its belief by plunking down $31 billion for gas-focused XTO Energy a year and a half ago. A company vice president, William Colton, recently told the New York Times that “If there is any kind of major trend, we think it’s going to be a shift toward more natural gas.” He added that “Natural gas is available. It’s the most efficient way to generate massive power. It’s affordable. We already have gas infrastructure in place. From a CO2 emissions standpoint, it’s 60 per cent cleaner than coal, and (the U.S. has) 100 years of supply.”

Agency Bull
America’s Energy Information Agency, whose job is to forecast supply and demand based on best-guess current trends, doesn’t appear to see much of a plan to promote greater use of natural gas anywhere in the future. According to the early-bird version of the 2011 forecast, “Non-hydro renewables and natural gas are the fastest growing fuels used to generate electricity, but coal remains the dominant energy source for electricity generation because of continued reliance on existing coal-fired plants” well into the foreseeable future.

According to the EIA, the agency has revised its methodology for gas prices “to better reflect a lessening of the influence of oil prices on natural gas prices, in part because of the increase in shale gas supply and improvements in natural gas extraction technologies.”

Of course, as Peter Tertzakian argues at the beginning of this article, it might be a mug’s game to discount energy equivalency too deeply when you are calculating the relative values of oil and gas.

Whatever methodology the organization uses, the EIA does forecast an increase in North America’s natural gas demand, but its estimates seem paltry compared to the aggressive development that T Boone Pickens, for example, is promoting.

The agency forecasts a strong near-term increasing demand because of a “strong recovery in near-term industrial production, growth in combined heat and power, and relatively low natural gas prices.” Look farther out into the future, however, and the agency’s forecasters are more circumspect than the gas supply bulls. “U.S. natural gas consumption rises 16 percent from 22.7 trillion cubic feet in 2009,” they intone, “to 26.5 trillion cubic feet in 2035.”

Such a small increase in forecast demand – 16% over 25 years – suggests that the EIA’s gas supply bulls aren’t as optimistic as Pickens; he might complain that they “don’t have a plan.” You could equally argue that there are contrarians among them.

Tell Your Banker to Buzz Off!

As lines of bank credit grow increasingly restrictive, royalty financing offers new options for operators. This article appears in the February issue of Oilweek

By Peter McKenzie-Brown and Richard Graham

Especially if you’re a natural gas producer, it can be tough to get credit these days. What are you going to do?

One possibility is to do what Compton Petroleum did last spring. Primarily a gas producer, the company sold a 5% royalty interest in 19,000 barrels of oil equivalent (BOEs) production per day, plus a 5% interest in 600,000 undeveloped acres to Caledonian Royalty Corporation, a company founded and managed by oil and gas financier Jim Kinnear.

In a way, royalty financing is filling a gap created by the elimination of energy trusts – at least, that’s what conventional wisdom would like you to think. However, as we researched this story, it became increasingly clear that royalty financing not only meets the needs of investors (especially heavy hitters), but it is also an excellent tool to meet the industry’s needs – natural gas companies like Compton Petroleum, for example, but other companies as well. While the industry traditionally associates the idea of royalties with government take, the new players in this area are promoting it as an effective alternative financing tool. While the jury is still out on whether it will be a preferred form of funding during the next boom, right now it has a lot of merit.

The Olden Days
Royalty funding is not new in Canada’s oil and gas sector, but the industry has to a large extent lost its collective memory of royalty financing. The founder of royalty financing in Canada was R.A. (Bob) Brown who, with his son – also named Bob Brown – later turned Home Oil into a major independent oil company.

During the Great Depression royalty financing played a critical role in the development of Turner Valley – at the time “the biggest oilfield in the British Empire.” On June 16, 1936, Brown senior’s Turner Valley Royalties #1 well began flowing 850 barrels of crude oil per day. Funded by royalty financing which guaranteed investors a percentage production from successful wells, Royalties #1 found Turner Valley’s oil formation two decades after earlier producers began stripping naphtha from wet gas discoveries there. This meant the first generation of producers had wasted much of the pressure needed to produce light oil from the reservoir.

Royalties financed 69 other wells in Turner Valley in the two years following Brown’s discovery. Since only two of those wells were dry, the primary constraint on new investment was the rapid saturation of local crude oil markets.

Royalties financing didn’t last, however. In 1938 the federal government decreed that income from oil production was taxable as profits in the hands of the producing company. In the investor’s hands it was taxed again as income, rather than return of capital. Although a producing company appealed this decision successfully, the incident shook confidence in the system. Indeed, in 1942 Ottawa amended the Income Tax Act to tax oil income from royalty trusts at wartime rates. Although the federal government repealed this provision in 1950, it was 70 years before petroleum royalties again became a significant alternative to traditional debt and equity.

Teams at Play
In recent years, at least four teams have suited up for the royalty game. Each team has its own style of play and a strategy that sounds like a winner. Brickburn Asset Management has the most passive style of play. Range Royalty Management is the brainchild of Clayton Woitas, founder of Renaissance Energy, and effectively combines royalty financing with E&P. Caledonian, founded and controlled by Jim Kinnear, is new while the fourth, Freehold Royalties Ltd. has roots going back to the creation of Canada.

Until it converted to a dividend-paying corporation at the beginning of 2011, Freehold was a publicly listed trust that issued distributions based on a large number of diverse royalty-generating properties (mineral rights and gross overriding royalties) and working interest properties. Its income comes from oil, gas, liquids and potash. Many of its properties are legacy assets – royalty rights which Ottawa granted to railroads and the Hudson’s Bay Company as part of the national effort to secure Western Canada. Freehold has interests in more than two million gross acres of land and 23,000 wells.

In a statement, the company’s president and chief executive officer, Bill Ingram, said that most “of our oil and gas production comes from mineral title lands and gross overriding royalties, which have no associated capital or operating costs; thus we have relatively low capital expenditure requirements. The strength of our royalties has allowed us to preserve a high payout ratio historically and should allow us to maintain a high dividend payout.”

The newest team is that of financier Jim Kinnear, who sees royalty financing as an extension of a common practice in Canada’s mining sector. When he started out in the securities business, says Kinnear, “we invested in small mining syndicates that had acquired claims – money returned plus a carried interest. I learned about returning capital to investors. People liked to see a return of cash or cash flow, and they still do.”

Last year, after retiring from Pengrowth Energy Trust – a business he founded and managed for over 20 years – Kinnear began applying this lesson in finance to oil and gas in an innovative way. So far he and his investors have placed $100 million in Caledonian Royalty Corporation. Their royalty investments – which represent registered interests in land and rank ahead of banks and other creditors – allow qualified investors to participate in cash flow based on production. Caledonian’s royalty interests include current production and potential future production from a large undeveloped land base in Alberta. At present, those assets are heavily weighted towards natural gas.

Range Royalty Management operates rather more like a traditional oil company, but also does financing through the issuance of royalties. The company was not willing to be interviewed for this story, but a source who asked to remain anonymous describes the firm as having “a great technical team. While they always want an overriding royalty, they get at it in a different way. They begin at the grassroots level” – by going to land sales, drilling and frequently operating oil and gas properties. Issuing royalties effectively gives the company financing that bears no interest, doesn’t need to be repaid and is free of commodity price risk.

The Problem with PUDs
Another newcomer to royalty financing is Bill Bonner, president of Brickburn Asset Management. Brickburn manages four partnership funds that invest in royalty interests under the WCSB brand name.

Although he has had a long career in oil and gas financing, Bonner only added royalty financing to his company’s portfolio in 2008. His system is both conservative and traditional. “We raise capital through prospectus,” he explains, “then make that capital available to experienced operators for the completion of development wells. In return, we earn a gross overriding royalty. One way to think about this is that we rent the operator’s wellbores. We are not concerned with any of the traditional costs, including the well’s ultimate abandonment.” He adds, “The sanctity of the royalty position is a very special place to get to.”

Bonner is adamant that royalty financing in its own right is an effective and robust form of finance rather than a replacement for the energy trust. When the oil industry goes into boom mode again, “we think there will still be opportunities for this kind of instrument, although candidly we don’t know for sure.”

He adds that “the main link between us and income trusts is that we pay out capital as we receive it. We provide a stream of income which the investor really likes. We are very much a distribution model as opposed to a model where you retain capital and grow. One of the advantages we have is that our investors get a tax write-off – a 30% Canadian Development Expense, which enables them to write off all of the money they have invested. It just takes time.”

He adds, “We have completed five partnerships totalling $82 million. We only take the money for three years. At that point our prospectuses say we will offer a ‘liquidity event’ to return the capital investment back to the investor. Our game plan is to somehow monetize the property after our investments have gone through a period of flush production – either by selling it outright or by somehow putting it into a going-concern business.”

Brickburn’s first royalty partnership came about in 2008. After the 2006 Halloween Massacre imposed a new tax on energy trusts, he says “it became increasingly difficult for smaller energy businesses to finance growth because for them the liquidation opportunity (selling their assets to energy trusts) had disappeared. So we moved in with this royalty instrument.” Complicating the tax problem was the financial crisis. Traditional sources of equity and debt financing for junior oil and gas companies seemed to have disappeared. Part of the solution was royalty financing.

Brickburn royalty partnerships have participated in more than 70 wells, 95% of which used horizontal multi-frac technology. “One of the reasons operators like us,” according to Bonner, “is that we extend their budgets. If we provide one and a half million dollars for a horizontal well, it frees up that much money for them to go do something else.” Royalties can add to the companies’ bottom lines in other ways, too. One of the main reasons is that operators tend to carry inventories of “proven undeveloped reserves,” or PUDs.

“The problem with PUDs,” says Bonner, “is that you get credit on your balance sheet for them as a proven resource, but now you have to throw a lot of money at them to turn them into developed resource. What we did was to come along and offer operators the opportunity to develop those PUDs in a way that was not dilutive to equity” since royalty interest investments equate to non-repayable loans. “Even though interest rates for the last couple of years have been close to zero, royalty financing is attractive because you don’t have to pay back the principle. When operators began to see this, they quickly realized that taking our capital was very accretive to the capital they had to spend themselves.”

Through its family of funds, Brickburn has acquired royalty interests through 11 operating companies, but is bound by agreement not to mention names. However, Delphi Energy and Bellatrix Exploration have both publically acknowledged that they use royalty financing from Brickburn.

Revolution Repeated

The Western Canada Sedimentary Basin. This article appears in the February issue of Oilweek.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown

First came the revolution in natural gas production – the shift to shale gas which, by bringing huge new stores of natural gas into the market drove prices down and made it necessary to fundamentally restructure Canada’s gas-prone petroleum sector. Now comes the revolution in the oilfield. Ironically, the same technologies that made shale gas possible are enabling the industry to begin the restructuring that the shift to shale gas made necessary.

“Oil doesn’t flow as well as gas,” Legacy Oil & Gas president Trent Yanko reminds us. “So in the oilfields of Alberta, especially, is a tremendous opportunity to recover unproduced oil. Original oil in place was in the billions of barrels, so if you can add only one, two, three percent to recovery there is quite an opportunity. You don’t have to be a wildcatter out in the jungle somewhere. All you have to do is better exploit what we already know is there.”

The technologies that made the shale gas revolution possible are beginning to have a similar impact in the light and conventional oil sector, which can now develop reservoirs that could not be exploited until energy prices and new technologies made production economic. For small companies in particular, this is presenting exceptional opportunities. From start-ups to mid-caps, companies like TriAxon and PetroBakken Energy are creating profitable enterprises from oilfields discovered 50 years ago. Already successful in similar enterprises, Legacy is taking on the big kahuna – the century-old field that put Canada’s petroleum headquarters on the map.
Juniors and the Treadmill

Since it became commonplace in the late 1980s, horizontal drilling has been enhanced by increased drilling efficiency. Much longer horizontal legs are now possible: many are two and three kilometres in length. This is possible because of improvements in bit design, the increasingly effective use of coil tubing and better down-hole motors. Other contributors include geo-steering and increasingly effective measurement-while-drilling (MWD) tools and techniques. Most important of all is multi-stage fracturing. The industry can now isolate many completion zones along lengthy horizontal wellbores: a two-kilometre horizontal leg can host up to 20 hydraulic fractures.

These technologies are making formations like the Bakken viable. Increasingly, the technologies that created the shale gas revolution – long horizontal wells and multistage fracturing – are being applied to aging light oil reservoirs in North America. This production phenomenon has also involved largely unacknowledged regulatory responses by the governments of Western Canada. These factors and other technologies are opening up important new opportunities for production from largely depleted reservoirs. For example, Gary Leach – executive director of SEPAC (the Small Explorers and Producers Association of Canada) – notes that “microseismic for the more precise design of frac jobs is a particularly important new technology.”

A year ago, TriAxon Resources represented a big success story among private junior oil companies. The company was created with what in 2006 was the novel idea of applying the cluster of new technologies to oil production. After screening available prospects, the company focused on the Bakken, Glauconite, Cardium, and Viking formations. The company raised $87 million in private financing; two and a half years later the partners sold out to Crescent Point Energy for $257 million.

Then, according to former president Jeff Saponja, he and his two partners – chief operating officer Colin Flanagan and operations vice president Rob Hari – took a two-week break before establishing TriAxon Oil Corp. – “TriAxon Two,” he calls it.

The opportunities come with a cost, of course. Saponja cautions that those technologies present unique challenges because they are so capital-intensive they. “Fifteen years ago, in the heyday of conventional oil exploration and production, you would put $150,000 to maybe $500,000 into the ground to get 200,000 barrels of oil,” according to Saponja. “Now you have to put maybe $4 million in the ground to get 200,000 barrels of oil, and you have a 50% to 80% initial rate of decline. To get these multistage frac wells to work you have to drill a lot of wells in these lower quality reservoirs.” This leads to what he calls the treadmill.

“To offset decline you have to be continually drilling, because the decline rate is so high. The main point of the equation is that these horizontal wells are very capital-intensive. Initially you get a very high rate of oil production but they will decline quite quickly. The economics are actually fairly marginal on a well to well basis, so you have to drill a lot of wells to benefit from scale. Except in the Bakken,” he says, “Most of these multistage frac wells really struggle if oil prices are below $60 or $70. For these wells to be really profitable, oil has to be over $80 a barrel.”

“You have to be continually drilling to offset decline. It’s called the treadmill. The main point of the equation is that these horizontal wells are very capital-intensive. Initially you get a very high rate of oil production but they will decline quite quickly. The economics are actually fairly marginal on a well-to-well basis, so you have to drill a lot of wells to benefit from scale. Except in the Bakken,” he says, “Most of these multistage frac wells really struggle if oil prices are below $60 or $70. For these wells to be really profitable, oil has to be over $80 a barrel.”

Does it make sense for private companies like TriAxon to stay public? According to Saponja, the economics of staying private are iffy. “These are very expensive wells. For a junior to stay on the treadmill becomes very difficult after you reach 3,000 or 4,000 barrels a day because you need a lot of capital to grow production and combat decline. The challenge that juniors face is that they have to either get their hands on more capital or be prepared to monetize their assets by selling them off. That’s the case for going public: it gives you access to low-cost capital. However, my partners and I are happy building basements, then selling them to the highest bidder.”

Midcaps in the Bakken
The highest bidder for TriAxon One was Crescent Point Energy – one of the two largest players in the Bakken, and the main competitor of PetroBakken, a midcap headed by Gregg Smith. “Our decline rates in the Bakken are about 60% in the first year, so we have to keep drilling to maintain production rates. You have to experiment a lot to be successful in plays like this. When you come into these plays your initial results are going to be mixed, but as you refine your drilling and production systems they improve.”

With considerable satisfaction, Smith notes his company’s success in drilling bilaterals from a single wellpad. “For PetroBakken to drill a single horizontal, the cost is $2.4 million. However, to drill two bilaterals from a single pad costs $3.6 million. It’s much more capital-effective, and it delivers an extra 50,000 barrels per well into the bargain.”

According to SEPAC’s Leach, the obviously improved economics of tighter spacing is generating “a regulatory response. The design of wellpads has to be different, and the new wellpads provide both environmental and economic benefits. Regulators are beginning to respond in all three western provinces.”

He adds, “The Cardium just began to take off in early 2009, and it was SEPAC companies – junior and midsized companies – that set the stage for this. Those sectors are looking to restructure because of the long-term poor prospects for natural gas, and this has played a role in that. It’s really turned around the fortunes of the industry, and generated a lot of investor interest.” With some satisfaction, he notes that multinational companies are coming back to North America to get back into the light and conventional oil resource plays. This involves a turnabout for some companies. for example, Talisman sold off a lot of its Alberta oil production just a few years ago.

PetroBakken’s Smith stresses that the situation in Canada is quite different than that in the United States. The Americans “are drilling shale oil plays. (By contrast) most of the horizontal wells with multistage fraccing in Canada are into reservoirs that were previously simply uneconomic or marginally economic (if you were trying to produce) oil from a vertical well.” This is all changing now, he says. “Now you’re seeing people try to tie up shale oil plays like the Alberta Bakken, the Duvernay and the Nordegg.”

Back to the Future
Of course, old hands in the oil industry are the first to tell you that technology has always been the key factor in expanding production. In fact, in this period of oilfield revolution the importance of technology is more obvious than ever before. According to Legacy president Trent Yanko, “Technology has always been an important part of oilfield development in Canada. I started out in Saskatchewan in 1980s, which was really Canada’s leader in horizontal drilling because of a major government incentive program.” After a few years the industry found itself drilling more horizontals in Saskatchewan than anywhere else in North America – “even the Austin Chalk” in Texas.

“Southeast Saskatchewan has been a classic case of the use of technology to extend the life of reservoirs,” Yanko continues. “Since the 1960s the industry has applied waterflood there, horizontal drilling, CO2 injection and other technologies, each of them extending the life of the province’s south-eastern petroleum reserves. As a result, in the late 1990s oil production matched what everybody thought had been the peak oil levels of 1966, and today the province is at record production.”

Almost all of the reservoirs now being developed with these technologies were discovered after 1947, when the Leduc discovery ushered in the industry’s modern age. Yanko, however, has plans to apply them in the petroleum industry’s birthplace. “Through the acquisition of a private company in July,” he says, “we acquired the Turner Valley oilfield. We control most of the production and all the facilities there.”

To understand Turner Valley’s significance, it’s worth noting that the field’s proximity to Calgary is the reason Canada’s petroleum sector is headquartered in the city. And, as SEPAC’s Gary Leach observes, Calgary now hosts the 45% of the world’s publicly traded oil and gas companies.

As he discusses this property, Trent Yanko becomes palpably excited. “There is still a lot of meat on the bone. There’s been less than 1% decline in (annual) oil production (from Turner Valley) over the last fifty years. The original oil in place was 1.3 billion barrels of 40° oil, and the historical recovery factor to date is only about 12%. So we think it has huge development potential. Before we acquired the property, the last vertical wells were drilled there in the 1940s. There was some horizontal drilling in the 1990s, but the field has been non-core for a long time.”

Although Legacy is proceeding cautiously, its president is thinking big. To begin with, Yanko believes Legacy has mapped a Cardium trend right on top of the field – “11 miles long and about 1½ miles wide,” with 10 metres gross maximum thickness. “In Turner Valley there’s a vertical well that just missed the Cardium and still produced more than 19,000 barrels. Otherwise, that trend hasn’t even been touched.”

“We believe the application of horizontal drilling and multi-stage frac technology can increase the recovery factor,” he adds. “So can infill drilling and reactivation of the waterflood. This property hits a lot of our hot buttons.” In the fall, the company drilled a number of vertical wells into the field. “We are going to frac them, and they will provide a great controlled environment to help us understand the horizons for future horizontal drilling. These wells will help us design that drilling program properly.”

When Turner Valley was first drilled in 1913, it was a wet gas field from which liquids were extracted and natural gas flared. A century later, with conventional gas again a marginally economic commodity, the prize sought in Turner Valley reservoirs is again its hydrocarbon liquids. The difference today is the toolkit.

Team of Rivals

As executive director of the Small Explorers and Producers Association of Canada, Gary Leach leads Canada's "Silicon Valley of oil"

This article appears in the February 2010 issue of Oilweek.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown

A year ago, Stan Odut was chairman of the Small Explorers and Producers Association of Canada (SEPAC), and he was deeply worried about the industry’s immediate future. “The sources of capital for the junior sector are equity, debt and cash flow,” he said, “but many companies are already mired in debt and credit lines are being pulled. You can’t get additional debt coverage. You can’t raise any equity because there is no reason for investors to put money into the energy business right now (because of collapsing commodity prices). And governments (provincially in particular) have strangled cash flow. So help me with the equation: you’ve got to get one of those factors to change to get the business going again.”

In the last year, what has changed? I put the question to Gary Leach, SEPAC’s executive director. He describes a cautious sense of optimism within the junior sector of Canada’s petroleum industry. There’s been a strong recovery in oil prices, for example, although gas prices are still languishing. “In recent months equity markets have been more supportive of the industry,” he adds, although they have been “selective”. They are targeting companies with “strong management, in certain commodity niches. But there is no tide that is lifting all boats.” Bank credit is still a problem for some companies; many are carrying a lot of debt, and lower commodity prices have reduced the value of their assets in the ground. Technically, this is known as a double-whammy.

On the positive side, “Banks have tried to be nimble and flexible. They don’t want to cause a lot of financial wreckage in the junior and midcap sector. A lot of the equity raised in recent months has been used to reduce debt, so things are improving.” However, he cautions, “If we don’t see a sustained rebound in gas prices in 2010, that may change.”

The Gas Story
Gary Leach describes himself as a “pure prairie product”. He was born in Manitoba, raised in Alberta and received post-secondary education (including a law degree) at the University of Saskatchewan. He spent much of his strictly legal career putting together international joint ventures, petroleum production sharing agreements, and international financing loans with multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

He joined Calgary-based Canadian Fracmaster in 1995 and stayed with the business after it was acquired by BJ Services Company, the Houston-based petroleum equipment and services giant. His background in down-hole completions is a notable asset for a spokesman in an industry being transformed by horizontal drilling and new fraccing technologies. Soft-spoken and articulate, Leach joined SEPAC – the trade association for 350 small oil companies – in 2006.

We began our discussion with the natural gas story. At time of writing, gas prices are sitting well below their ten-year average. Where are those prices headed? “I think right now there’s possibly a larger gap in opinions about where gas prices are going than any time I can remember,” Leach says. “There are people who say the potential international demand (for gas) has barely been touched, so prices should go up. Others talk about the huge international supply potential, and they see things the other way.” Perhaps remembering the adage that predictions are especially perilous when they pertain to the future, he says “We are never going to get out of these swings in gas prices. I think there are going to continue to be big swings in the gas market. I don’t think anyone can accurately forecast gas prices beyond a couple of quarters.”

“For companies carrying a lot of gas assets on their balance sheets, it’s not a great time to be selling. “There are going to be a lot of assets put on the market. A lot of big companies” – he mentions Talisman, EnCana and Suncor – “are talking about moving conventional gas reserves off their balance sheets. The lowest cost gas resources are the ones they are going to pursue, and those resources are now shale gas resources.”

Since gas-price volatility is a fact of life, he says, “The low-cost suppliers are the ones that are going to do best. Companies have to learn how to drive down their costs.” For the junior sector, which has a lot of conventional gas on the books, the outlook is particularly uncertain. “The leading shale gas resource in western Canada is in a place that’s so remote and so expensive that mostly big players can participate. However, as the technologies and the infrastructure are developed, the smaller players will get in.”

Behind the Curve
When you ask Leach about Alberta’s place in western Canada’s industry, he is oddly ambivalent. For example, on the matter of shale gas he says, “If we were further along the curve in Alberta in developing shale gas resources, the smaller players would be developing them. But Alberta’s industry is behind the curve.”

He notes that both British Columbia and Saskatchewan long ago introduced important incentives for the industry, but that those policy environments didn’t spur high levels of petroleum sector growth until the technological environment changed in recent years. For example, Saskatchewan’s “Bakken field has been known for years. We used to just drill right through it. However, it is only recent that the technologies of horizontal well completions and multistage fracturing” – the technologies that led to the shale gas revolution – “made that reservoir viable.”

Alberta, of course, is quite different from either of those provinces. “The (Western Canada Sedimentary) Basin covers the province from north to south. We have every conceivable hydrocarbon opportunity here. There’s a lot of excitement about using those technologies to improve production from formations in Alberta that are well past their glory days – the Viking formation, the Cardium formation. A lot of companies are looking at targeting oil in these formations, but using horizontal wells and multistage fractures.” Leach thinks the industry will soon successfully use these methods to increase oil recovery in Alberta.

What is SEPAC’s single biggest challenge? Here his message is particularly striking. “We have to help policy makers and politicians understand what a tremendously exciting, dynamic, vibrant group of junior and mid-cap companies we have in Canada. Almost half the world’s publically traded oil companies are here in Calgary. It’s a remarkable statistic. It’s the closest thing to a Silicon Valley type business culture and industry cluster we in Canada have ever developed. It’s emerged on its own without government help. But over the years, we have had all these companies competing with each other. Hundreds and hundreds of companies are competing with each other for land, for resources, for capital. They have a tremendous publically accessible database that puts small companies on an equal footing with big players. It’s the most unique oil industry in the world, and Canada’s most successful business story. We need policy-makers to understand that story, so they don’t see the industry as just eight or ten companies. Let’s see the big picture, and not do things to harm it. This industry is amazing. We don’t want to lose it. We want to nurture it. It’s a great incubator of new ideas.”

Leach sees the Alberta government’s recent adjustments to the royalty changes of two years ago as a SEPAC success. “Both times (Premier) Stelmach came out with revisions to the royalty regime, he specifically mentioned that he wanted to help Alberta’s junior petroleum sector. The Alberta incentives brought additional cash flow, reduced costs, drew some investment into Alberta that would. They helped, but they were not the complete answer. They couldn’t help everybody.”

SEPAC is now working with other industry associations, the financial sector and others in developing a study of investment competitiveness within the province, which will be complete in the New Year. The idea is to answer the question, “Compared to other investment places, how does Alberta rate?” The provincial government will then have to take all that information and decide on new policies. We think if the province can set itself up as one of the world’s best places to invest, its future will be bright.” Citing a report from a large bank, he points out that about 60 per cent of the world’s investible oil resources are here in Alberta. Big international oil companies have been boxed into smaller and smaller bits of the world. This is one of the few places in the world where companies can book meaningful reserves additions.”

Moving Ahead
I’m always interested in the responses of senior people in the patch to the issue of peak oil, so I put the question to Gary Leach. His response is forceful and direct. “I think we’re near peak cheap oil. I think we’re near peak easily accessible oil. But the amount of oil in the world is enormous. The biggest problem to developing oil has to do with policy restrictions – off-limits restrictions on resource development. The US has huge oil shale resources, for example, but they are politically inaccessible.” Working with their client national oil companies, oil-rich countries have put resource development off limits to private sector oil companies. He mentions Venezuela’s Orinoco ultra heavy oil belt, Alberta’s oilsands, the vast heavy oil deposits in Russia, then cites the old gag that the Stone Age didn’t end because we ran out of stones.

He’s now just warming up. “The petroleum age won’t end because we run out of petroleum. Western European countries are consuming less oil than they did 30 years ago, and the United States is consuming less than it did in 2007. The petroleum age may end in a gentle decline because some of the advanced countries begin to move away from (oil). I don’t think it will end with apocalyptic change. Price signals will put a limit on demand.”

I mention the often-cited rapid demand growth in China and India among developing countries and the rapid growth in OPEC countries like Venezuela, where consumer prices are greatly subsidized. “Rapidly growing countries like India and China are still poor countries,” he counters. “They can live with a price around today’s price (US$77 per barrel) but they cannot afford oil at $150-$200 per barrel. (If prices rise to those levels) there will have to be some kind of market response. Before 500 million Chinese own a car, they will be driving something that doesn’t rely on oil: Maybe electricity-fuelled vehicles charged from nuclear reactors.” Whatever those vehicles are, Leach has no doubt “there are going to be other factors on the demand side, the technology side, that will temper those straight-line graphs that say oil demand will outstrip oil supply and prices will skyrocket.”

Of course, a basic principle of free-market economics is that supply and demand must always be in balance. Neither does a world with global economic growth constrained by energy shortages sound reassuring. Indeed, the situation he is describing seems compatible with mainstream peak oil theory, so I wonder whether his arguments against worldwide economic destabilization have settled the issue. All the same, I have thoroughly enjoyed the discussion. We shift gears, moving to lighter topics.

Has he read any good books lately? Yes, he says. He reads a lot, and is now reading Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln by Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Doris Kearns Goodwin. This thick book describes Abraham Lincoln’s leadership skills by focusing on his war cabinet, which included three of the political rivals he beat in the 1859 presidential campaign. According to Leach, “it was amazing how he turned these diverse people into a team during the most cataclysmic period of American history.”

For a guy with responsibility for managing SEPAC’s affairs and representing its views to government, the news media and the public, political genius may be just what the doctor ordered. Bear in mind that “nearly half of the world’s public oil companies are here in Calgary.” Within the modern petroleum age, those hundreds of companies have become a team of rivals for the global oil industry to reckon with.

Related articles by Zemanta

• Alberta gives up $1.5B in royalties by rolling out new industry incentives (calgaryherald.com)
• Alberta readies royalty curves, aims to fix soured oilpatch ties (calgaryherald.com)

Star Power

As fusion power progresses, the Alberta Council of Technologies urges the province to take a leading role in developing the power of the sun This article appears in the August 2009 issue of Oilweek; graphic from here

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
During the Second World War, celebrity physicist Albert Einstein suggested in a now-famous letter to American President Roosevelt that nuclear chain reactions in large masses of uranium could release “vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements.” And, he speculated, “Extremely powerful bombs of a new type may thus be constructed.”

While America had only poor-quality uranium, Einstein noted, “There is some good ore in Canada.” The ore used to create the first atomic bombs came from a rich deposit of uranium and radium along the shores of Great Bear Lake, in the Northwest Territories.

During the long days of summer, a wartime mining company hired local Indian men to carry 40-kilo burlap bags of ore from the mine to the Mackenzie River. They carried those loads for long hours, for months on end. When the bags ripped apart, they shifted the spilled ore off the trail, but took the contaminated bags to their temporary village. Years later, the ore-carriers began dying of cancer, and the community now known as Deline became a village of widows.

Canada was thus an important contributor to the first nuclear age, which was born of the fission of radioactive elements. Within a decade, the United States had made tentative steps toward a different kind of nuclear age – one based on nuclear fusion. This system smashes together light atoms like those of hydrogen. As it turns lighter elements into heavier ones, fusion releases vast amounts of energy.

This is the principle behind the hydrogen bomb. It is star power – the fuel that keeps the Sun and the countless other stars alight. As a human invention, its only practical use has been as an unused weapon of violence and terror. Until now.

"[Fusion ignition] is imminent and will be one of the most extraordinary technologies discovered by mankind. We will be reproducing the physics of the sun.”

On March 10, the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore Labs in California trained 192 high-power lasers onto a point the size of a couple of match-heads. The ensuing reaction generated more than a million joules of energy – enough energy to theoretically light up 10,000 100-watt light bulbs.

The American effort was costly, but its implications were huge. That step suggests the birth of a nuclear age in which virtually limitless amounts of inherently safe and environmentally attractive will be cheaply available.

Compared with carbon or uranium fuels, fusion generates little radiation and no greenhouse gases or air pollution. Since it uses small amounts of fuel, it is likely to have little impact on land and habitat. The day before this extraordinary American achievement, a standing committee of the Alberta Legislature met to consider a proposal by which Canada would become involved in these revolutionary technologies.

Canada would not supply ore, as we do for nuclear fission. After all, the fuels needed for fusion are abundant around the world. Instead, we would help develop technological expertise for the second nuclear age.

Visionaries: The proposal came from a small, minimally-funded and loosely-organized group of visionaries provincially chartered as the Alberta Council of Technologies. Clearly, the goal of the media relations surrounding the meeting with the legislature was maximum public awareness. In this, they certainly succeeded.

The idea is to prove that controlled nuclear fusion can become the world’s energy future. Theoretically, it could provide clean and nearly limitless electrical power for humankind, with everything that implies. It could mean a reversal of global warming and the reversal of policies by which agricultural products are transformed into fuel. According to Dr. Perry Kinkaide, the group’s chairman, his council was asking the province to contribute to a demonstration of fusion ignition.

Fusion ignition, he said, “is imminent and will be one of the most extraordinary technologies discovered by mankind. We will be reproducing the physics of the sun.” When you get into the physics of this “imminent” technology, which talks about creating temperatures so hot (up to 100 million degrees Celsius) that they can only be enclosed by magnetic fields or lasers, it’s like tripping forward through a time-warp. Yet new technologies – demonstrated by the test at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories – have changed the picture.

Adds Allan Offenberger, a retired University of Alberta engineering professor and another program proponent, it is the new technology of “inertial confinement” of the heat of fusion that is changing everything. Inertial confinement uses laser beams to quickly heat to ignition a “fuel pellet” of simple atoms like the commonplace hydrogen isotope deuterium and the much less stable hydrogen isotope tritium. Because this process rapidly induces fusion, you don’t have to confine the fuel at all. The advantage: a relatively simple reaction chamber design.

Even so, this is a long-term proposition. A demonstration project isn’t likely for 25 years, say, with commercial facilities following a decade after that. However, the promise is great. Once the bugs have been worked out, the fusion energy could be very cheap.

To begin to develop expertise in this area, the proposal suggested that the province pony up $4 million this year and commit to another $17 million, total, in the two fiscal years following. The proponents argued that if Alberta scientists don’t get in on the ground floor, they will fall behind in expertise. Joining the project later, they argue, will be more expensive Once the province got its foot in the door, the proponents call for an intensive program of R&D “to develop inertial fusion as a viable energy technology.”

This phase would cost perhaps $40 million per year. Eventually, according to the council, having expertise within the province could lead to commercialization of the technologies. Perhaps the province could become “a provider of high power lasers, reactor systems engineering and related technologies for fusion energy and other applications.”

According to Offenberger, the aim is to create a safe, relatively cheap and clean method of producing electricity based on fusion. One attraction of this form of energy, he says, is that huge amounts of energy could be created with less than a kilogram a day of two types of hydrogen fuel. Also, there is no chance of meltdowns from this form of nuclear energy, which produces no hazardous wastes. The only waste products are heat and, from the size plant the group visualizes, about a kilo of helium per day.

The proposal also points out that there could be huge savings on transmission costs “because (fusion) plants can be located close to electricity users.” Canada is the only major industrial country without a fusion research presence. Given the country’s energy wealth, proximity to the United States and trade surpluses, perhaps that’s not unreasonable. I put the question to someone with the broadest imaginable view of electricity supply and demand within Alberta.

Technological Dominance: At the time of our interview, Martin Merritt was completing his term as the Alberta government’s Market Surveillance Administrator. His job was to make sure electricity and natural gas markets within the province were free and fair. Although he was quick to say he had no expertise in nuclear fusion, he surmised that “The best place to do this would be in the US, where the problems of energy supply, environmental problems, worries about global warming and the need to remain technologically dominant are so powerful. Europe also has those problems. In that sense, the timing seems perfect” to be developing these technologies.

By contrast, he opined, “Alberta’s main reason (to become involved) is that as an important energy power, we have many reasons to have an oar in developing energy technology.” He added that “Alberta needs to get around the (environmental) brush we’ve been tarred with. Perhaps adopting this form of energy could earn us green credits.”

Perry Kinkaide’s Council of Technologies, however, sees an urgent need for Canadian involvement. In a document on the council’s website, the group argues that “The window of opportunity is closing fast for Alberta and Canada to participate in a global partnership for developing ‘fusion,’ the ideal solution for meeting the world’s primary energy requirements – forever! Participation will secure our position as an energy superpower as the world transitions to fusion, with significant socio-economic and environmental spin-off benefits.” In this compelling commentary, the organization addressed “the need for fusion energy and the prospects of a revolutionary new technology for its achievement.”

Citing significant environmental, health and safety implications, it also noted that “the strategic fit of fusion technology with the demands of North America’s coal-based electric power industry as plants reach end-of-service and require replacement.” What is needed immediately, they insist, is an action plan “to ensure Alberta’s and Canada’s place in the emerging fusion-energy economy.” While the notion of fusion energy is closely tied to the generation of electricity, perhaps it could meet an oilsands challenge which went untried during the optimistic early years of the first nuclear age.

Fifty years ago, Richfield Oil Company proposed an experimental plan to release liquid hydrocarbons from the oilsands through the expedient of an underground nuclear explosion. The company proposed detonating a nine-kiloton explosive device below the oil sands at a site 100 kilometres south of Fort McMurray.

Thermonuclear heat would create a large underground cavern and simultaneously liquefy the oil. The cavern could serve as a collection point for the now-fluid bitumen, enabling the company to produce it. This idea came remarkably close to actually taking place. The project received federal approval in Canada, and America’s Atomic Energy Commission agreed to provide the device. But before the pilot could take place, public pressure for an international ban on nuclear testing had mounted.

As the late Ernest Manning once told me, when he was premier the federal government withheld approval and thus killed the plan. Perhaps in the second nuclear age, energy from nuclear fusion could become a safe and realistic heat source for producing and refining the dense oils Canada is famous for. This idea may sound far-fetched until you consider that in Peace River Shell is already testing the use of electric heaters to refine bitumen carbonates in situ, deep inside underground formations. When you start talking about a second nuclear age, nothing seems impossible.

Keeping Electricity Competitive

Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator, Martin Merritt is head of an independent agency developed to ensure that the province’s electric markets operate in a fair, efficient and competitive fashion. The MSA also monitors the retail natural gas market. This article was carried in The Calgary Herald September 12, 2008.

By Martin Merritt A few weeks ago, The Calgary Herald carried an item reporting that Alberta had just set a new summer record for power consumption, eclipsing last summer’s record by 2.3 per cent. The good news is that we had plenty of supply to meet this record. The concern is that as we continue to post records we may not have the transmission to ensure that the lowest cost supplies reach us as consumers.

As a consumer, I get the best deal for myself if I can buy things – cars, groceries, gasoline and other forms of energy – freely on the open market. In a market economy, our choices as consumers give a great incentive for sellers to keep their costs low. If we were constrained to buy from only a few sellers, we would have less choice and prices would likely be higher.

I also wear another hat. As Alberta’s Market Surveillance Administrator – the guy responsible for making sure our electricity market functions competitively – I understand that constrained markets can prevent low-cost sellers from prevailing in the marketplace. In the case of electrical power, we need more than the supply necessary to meet Alberta’s needs. We need a system that allows electricity to flow freely around the province. That requires adequate transmission capacity.

Alberta’s electricity market provides consumers with secure supplies and competitive pricing, but the transmission system is becoming undersized for the job in some places. Whether for home appliances or running business operations, consumers will only get the best deal on power when the transmission system can transport electricity from (almost) any generator in Alberta to (almost) any consumer in Alberta. This is why I am concerned about the tremendous hurdles facing new transmission projects these days.

Electricity generators are like stores, and the transmission system is like the network of roads that enables us to get to and from the supermarket. If major roadways became so congested that we had to buy all of our groceries from the local convenience store we all know what would happen to our family’s food bill.

This isn’t just theory. It’s already affecting us. Today we are moving a lot more electricity through the transmission system than we did when it went through its last major upgrade over 20 years ago. In constrained areas of our grid, this has dramatically pushed up the energy losses from transportation.

For example, between the Lake Wabamun area where about 40% of Alberta’s generation is located and the Calgary area, losses average over 10%. According to the Alberta Electric System Operator, additional transmission capacity would save enough energy to power half the City of Red Deer. Losses on that scale are pure economic and environmental waste. More recently, in the five years from 2002-2007, Albertans paid almost $300 million in subsidies to electricity generators for helping us get around our transmission bottlenecks. The subsidization rate is presently $40-$50 million annually.

Some advocate expanding this practice – paying generators to locate in sub-optimal places in order to avoid investing in transmission infrastructure that the province badly needs. This amounts to renting band-aids rather than fixing the root problem. This band-aid approach might work well for the band-aid vendors but it’s certainly not in the best interest of Albertans if we expect to continue to realize the larger benefits of a broadly competitive electricity market.

In Alberta today, the wholesale electricity market is worth about $5 billion a year, less than 10% of this represents the cost of transmission. The economic challenge of trying to avoid or defer transmission investment beyond what we have already realized is that you put the competitive efficiency of a $5 billion market at risk, in order to chase questionable savings in the 10% piece – penny-wise, but pound-foolish.

Allowing growth in demand to outstrip the capacity of our existing transmission system puts the benefits and perhaps even the reality of a competitive electricity market at risk. Experience in other electricity markets has shown that the practice of subsidizing generators to locate in particular places can have expensive and unintended consequences. Once generation economics start to hinge on capturing subsidies rather than on efficiency and low-cost, the broader benefits of the competitive market become compromised. Consumers expect and need generators to compete with each other on the basis of efficiency and generation cost. Transmission enables this competition to occur. Subsidized generation distorts it. Unless we invest in transmission, Albertans’ bills will continue to reflect the growing cost of rented band-aids, high losses and diminished competition. The longer we take to build the transmission we need, the more rent cheques go down the drain.

In southern Alberta, we have great sites for generating electricity from the wind. Investors are willing to build there, but we have a shortage of transmission. Similarly, northern Alberta is the logical place to locate fossil fuel generators. They are most efficient (both economically and thermodynamically) when they can be located at low altitude, in cooler temperatures and near a substantial supply of water. There too, we have a shortage of transmission. By bringing all electricity supply sources to all consumers across the province, transmission provides us with choice and forces suppliers to compete with each other.

Subsidizing higher cost, less efficient generators to locate in the middle does neither.

These are powerful realities. Some advocates of gas-fired generation in southern Alberta will soon enough be asking for subsidies – for without them their projects are unlikely to be able to compete. About half of Alberta’s residential consumers live in the transmission-constrained southern part of the province, but the case for reinforcing our transmission grid is not an argument for southern consumers alone. All Albertans benefit the most from the most competitive market possible. We must find ways to enable the fair and timely development of critical transmission infrastructure. We need more transmission capacity because that – not subsidized generators – is the best way to assure the competitive market that Albertans have come to expect.

Pushing South

Notes on geopolitics as Canadian crude pushes toward the Gulf Coast This article appears in the June 2008 issue of Oilsands Review.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown 
“There certainly appear to be a lot of forces increasing the demand for Canadian heavy, particularly in the US,” says Steve Wuori. Enbridge’s executive vice president observes that right now only Venezuela and Mexico are seriously competing for the heavy oil market in the Gulf Coast, and “there are declines in Mexican supplies for geologic reasons, and Venezuelan declines for both economic and political reasons. So structurally it’s a very good time for Canadian heavy oil to secure that market."


Wuori’s comments reflect a sea change in Canada’s approach to selling the stuff. Early bitumen development in Alberta was slow and easy – regional producers supplying heavy oil to refineries in America’s northern tier states, with virtually no competition from overseas. Today, with surging supplies projected well into the future, Canadian producers, pipelines and marketers have had to become aggressive. Global forces are having a greater impact on the industry than ever before. This is a good news/bad news story. The good news is that there are chinks in the armour of our offshore competitors – lots of them. The bad news is that the chinks in Canada’s armour are costing the country dear. Consider the following.

• Already the world leaders in bitumen production and an important producer of conventional heavy, Canadians have roughly doubled their non-upgraded bitumen production in less than four years.
• American decision-makers would be delighted to replace politically volatile Venezuelan supply with low-risk Canadian product, and Venezuela’s present leadership would be equally happy to develop markets elsewhere.
• Mexico’s supergiant Cantarell heavy oil field is in steep decline, but Canada has the productive potential to offset the shortfalls.
• The isolation of the Canadian prairies from the world’s sea lanes and from America’s major refining centres means bitumen producers can’t freely compete in world markets. Consequently, they get lower prices.
• As price-takers in North American markets, Canada’s producers have to settle for lower profits, and the province has to settle for diminished royalty revenue.

All these matters have geopolitical overtones. One way or another, each calls for the economic fix of more fully integrated global markets. This article focuses on the importance to Canadian producers of integration into world markets, and some of the ideas in play to achieve it. Let’s begin with Alberta’s relative isolation.

The Economic Burden of Under-Priced Oil:Western Canada’s heavy oil sells for less than the price it would fetch on the open seas. “Alberta is not an island,” observes FirstEnergy’s Steven Pachet, with a somewhat understated taste for the obvious. “If it were, world market prices for heavy oil would be easier to obtain. Alberta is landlocked, and pipeline capacity to other markets is sometimes restricted. Mountains to the west make pipeline transportation to the Pacific difficult, while the bulk of North America stands between Alberta and the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.”

While heavy oil and bitumen sell at a discount to light crude both in Alberta and around the world, sometimes the Alberta discount increases when heavy crude from Alberta cannot reach markets. Known as the heavy oil differential, it represents the difference between the prices of Alberta’s Lloyd blend heavy oil and Mexico’s Maya crude, adjusted for transportation costs.

Lack of transportation is the main reason for the differential. The refineries that are accessible to Alberta heavy crude and bitumen can only handle so much supply. Alberta producers have limited access to US markets because of pipeline constraints, and the refining and upgrading systems in Western Canada are not nearly large enough to handle all the new production. As available supplies rise, refiners lower the price they will pay for Alberta’s heavy and oil sands-based crude until it is below world prices: the greater the competition to sell that oil, the lower the market price and the greater the differential.

This market behaviour costs Alberta, big-time. To help put it in perspective, during the final quarter of last year the differential averaged US$17.94 per barrel – the largest discount ever for Canadian heavy.

Such discounts are an economic burden on both producers and government. By Paget’s calculations, in 2008 bitumen producers will forego $1.88 billion because of the differential. This estimate uses very specific assumptions about how oil prices will behave this year.

When he presents an estimate for the cost of the discount to the provincial government, however, Paget uses a range of assumptions for its impact on royalties. In his view, the discount could cost Alberta some $200-$500 million in foregone royalty income. Also, of course, foregone revenues mean foregone taxes at every level of government.

The size of the prize can be measured in billions, but the penalty for inaction could be greater still: growing surpluses leading to greater discounts and diminishing development. The simple logic of this situation is clear. The large sums in play mean a lot of incentive for change, and a lot of change is on the way.

According to Paget, “Oil sands producers have a choice. Upgrade the bitumen into synthetic crude for higher unit revenue, or sell the bitumen and let others invest the capital to refine it into lighter crude and petroleum products.” This fundamental choice can be resolved with three kinds of development: New and expanded upgrading systems; expanded pipelines for existing markets; the creation of new markets. All are under consideration, and all are needed to meet the growing heavy flow from Alberta.

Getting to the Gulf: Here is the problem in a nutshell. Access to the world gives you the best available prices for your heavy oil. Access to a crowded regional market gives you Western Canada’s heavy oil discount. That is why the marketing Shangri-la for the heavy oil sector is the Gulf of Mexico, and why it’s important at this point to discuss the labyrinthine world of pipelines.

Cushing, Oklahoma, is now the southernmost delivery point for Canadian oil, and the closest delivery point to the vast coastal refinery complexes in Texas (4 million barrels throughput per day) and Louisiana (3.3 million barrels per day). Cushing itself has more than half a million barrels per day of refining capacity, so you can see the importance of delivering oil to these key markets. However, Enbridge’s pipeline to land-locked Cushing now supplies only 120,000 barrels of oil per day – soon to be increased by more than half. Shipping capacity from Canada to Cushing will increase by another 155,000 barrels per day with the completion two years from now of TransCanada’s Keystone Oil Pipeline extension.

Steve Paget explains the inexorable implications of these expansions. “By late 2010, total Canadian shipping capacity to Cushing will increase to 345,000 barrels per day. This is 65 per cent of Oklahoma’s total refining capacity. Canadian producers will need access to new markets to avoid swamping Oklahoma refineries.” After all, swamped refineries mean lower oil prices because of greater competition.

At the moment, Canada has no direct access to the Gulf, although small amounts – in the order of 15,000 barrels per day – are transhipped there from Cushing. Both Enbridge and TransCanada are proposing further pipeline extensions to the Gulf Coast to avoid Canadian crude being stuck in Oklahoma. The American Gulf Coast has refining capacity for bitumen, and it also needs new sources of heavy crude.

Of course, heavy oil developments in Canada are creating the need for much greater pipeline access to the coast than the volumes Enbridge and TCPL will be providing to (and south from) Cushing. At this writing there are four other proposals to increase pipeline capacity to the Gulf.

• Enbridge’s Access Pipeline would expand existing pipe and extend the system from central Illinois to the Gulf. This would provide 445,000 barrels per day of capacity. ExxonMobil is a 50 per cent joint venture owner of the proposed pipeline and owns useful rights-of-way.
• TransCanada is also considering several possibilities – notably (with Conoco Phillips) the Keystone project, which will convert a segment of TCPL’s natural gas mainline for oil transportation.
• Another possible entrant is the Chinook system – a 300,000 barrel-per-day proposal by two American firms, which would use existing rights-of-way to ship.
• The Altex Pipeline – proposed by a private company – would use new technologies to ship 425,000 barrels of bitumen per day south.

Ironically, increased oil sands production in Alberta has greatly increased the province’s need to import condensate – the mix of light hydrocarbons used to dilute bitumen to enable it to flow through pipelines. That need, in turn, is leading to the construction of yet another pipeline. According to Steve Paget, “diluent (condensate) is being shipped into the province by railcar these days. There’s plenty of diluent in North America, but how much do we want to move in by train? It’s like the old Rockefeller days. The problem is getting it here at a reasonable price, and that problem is being resolved by construction of the Southern Light pipeline, which will move diluent from Chicago to Edmonton.”

As Canada develops greater access to Gulf Coast markets, Canada’s heavy oil differential should disappear. The reason is simple. Unfettered free-market oil prices reflect just two factors: transportation costs and crude oil quality. Canada’s competitors into the Gulf Coast region – notably Mexico and Venezuela – have the option to cheaply take their production by tanker, anywhere in the world, to the highest bidder. This means their prices are driven by competition for the world’s highest prices. By contrast, Western Canadian producers are competing in a small and crowded marketplace.

The Competition: Markets always face complicating factors, and the situation along the Gulf Coast is no different. As Steve Wuori points out, “The issues are increasing Canadian supply and possible political issues between Venezuela and the United States. Venezuela has gravitated toward China and possibly other customers. This has made it more feasible for Canadian oil to replace Venezuelan production in Chicago and south.” Because of political turmoil, employees at Petróleos de Venezuela struck some years ago, cutting deeply into production a few years ago. Also, of course, the country’s disputes with ExxonMobil and other multinational companies have made international headlines.

Closer to home, the vast Cantarell heavy oil field, which provides about half of Mexico’s oil production, is in rapid decline. According to the director-general of national oil company PEMEX, production from the offshore field declined by more than 13 per cent in 2006 alone. Cantarell’s production peaked at 2.1 million barrels per day barely four years ago, but is forecast to average only a million barrels per day by the end of this year.

According to FirstEnergy’s Steven Paget, “There’s a possibility of Mexico becoming a net oil importer if the decline at Pemex is not turned around, so it is for several reasons not wise to depend on those two countries for oil.” Enter Canada – a secure and reliable supplier with vast and growing supplies of heavy oil and eager to displace imports from Latin America to the Gulf Coast.

The geopolitical considerations do not end there, however. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez is increasingly unpopular at home, the country’s economy is in disarray, its heavy oil resources rival Canada’s, its labour costs are low and its transportation costs to the US Gulf Coast are a fraction of Western Canada’s. It is possible to imagine a post-Chavez Venezuela developing those resources and becoming a resurgent competitor.

Don’t put all your eggs in one basket: such is the weakness in the Canadian strategy of focusing on markets in Texas and Louisiana. From the Gulf, Canada’s heavy oil producers would have tanker access to the whole world, but not before paying huge pipeline costs from Alberta. To help forestall such an eventuality, Enbridge has proposed a project named Gateway.

A Nearby, Open-water Port: "Usually to create a market you need producer push and refiner pull,” says Steven Paget. “We are definitely seeing (both) for Gulf coast markets,” but right now the producer push to reach Asian markets is pretty slim. However, Enbridge is planning just such a line.

Gateway is “a heavy oil pipeline from Edmonton to Kitimat (British Columbia) to carry oil to a different market than the southern US,” Steve Wuori explains. “It would carry oil to California and to Southeast Asia, by ship. The appeal to Canadian producers is that you would get another bid on the crude oil from somewhere other than the United States.” Also, of course, pipeline costs would be less.

“When (Enbridge) first started we were aiming for 2011,” Wuori says. “But now we are targeting 2012-2014” to get this line into production. Will Canada be able to supply all these markets with heavy? Wuori thinks so. “The production forecasts up to 2020 for the oil sands support that kind of growth potential, even if you risk it for economics and environmental concerns.” Indeed, Enbridge is even looking for ways to take Canadian heavy to refineries in Ohio and Kentucky “and even beyond that to the east coast of the US – to ensure that there is market for Canadian production.”

Canada’s bitumen production is the ultimate example of the blackening of the barrel in the petroleum world. For more than two decades there has been a shift in global production from light, sweet, high-quality oils to heavy, sour, poor-quality crude. This “blackening of the barrel” has been problematic for many refiners, since black barrels bring with them environmental drawbacks, require capital-intensive equipment, and refine into lower-value barrels of fuel and other products.

Most refiners prefer higher-quality oils, and producers prefer to sell those oils because they fetch a better price. So does the government of Alberta, because it wants to realize as much of the economic benefit from the oil sands as possible. What’s a province to do? FirstEnergy’s Paget has an idea that deserves sharing.


Upgrader Option: As resource owner, the government of Alberta receives its royalty share from bitumen and heavy oil production in kind – that is, it receives oil, which it then needs to turn around and sell. Most producers that upgrade their oil sands in Alberta into lighter crude or petroleum products pay royalties based on the bitumen price.

Therefore, any discount for Alberta oil sands bitumen results in decreased royalties and decreased Government of Alberta revenue, whether the crude is upgraded in Alberta or elsewhere. “Assume that bitumen royalties are 10 per cent” this year, says Paget, and that the oil sands produce 1.3 million barrels per day.” This would mean the province receives 130,000 barrels of bitumen each day in royalties – a volume forecast to grow into the foreseeable future.

“Why wouldn’t Alberta guarantee that amount as feedstock for a private-sector upgrader?” Paget asks. “If the government believes in upgrading in Alberta, then taking the oil which it in fact owns and dedicating it to Alberta upgrading is a good way to do it. It’s a good way to make policy without investing much money directly. A hundred and thirty thousand royalty barrels per day is easily enough to support one or two stand-alone upgraders.”

Paget weighs the possibilities. “The government of Alberta is faced with a dilemma. Investment is lost (whenever raw) bitumen is exported. How much investment might be lost if bitumen exports from the province increase by 500,000 barrels per day? With current pipeline constraints and artificially high differentials, royalty revenue is already being lost.”

The new pipelines under construction don’t present an obstacle to this proposal, since most of the oil pipelines from the province can ship both bitumen and other crudes, including synthetic oil. Indeed, this idea seems to be one that will benefit the province in many ways. Provincial royalties would increase, and so would producer profits.

Damage Control

Gasoline and other fuel prices are subsidized in the three representative oil-producing countries graphed on the top right - to the point that gasoline costs $0.12 per gallon in Caracas.

Compare the growth in oil consumption in those countries to growth for the world as a whole. Did you notice a pattern?

By Peter McKenzie-Brown

The world has two kinds of energy-consuming jurisdictions: Those which respond to high oil prices, and those which don’t. In this post, I want to help define which is which. I also want to offer a few explanations why dramatic increases in energy prices have not yet damaged the world economy. These are intimately related issues.

I recently had an interview with Marcel Coutu, the chair of Syncrude – the world’s largest oil sands plant. Syncrude has been in operation for 30 years, and it has gone through a great deal of debottlenecking and expansion. It now produces 350,000 barrels of light, synthetic oil per day.

I asked Marcel for his thoughts on peak oil, and he gave me a few comments that summarize things precisely.

All OPEC can now do is raise prices by cutting production. They cannot lower prices by increasing production because they don’t have the capacity. We are in a very pure free market situation, with prices being set by supply and demand. When I look at that dynamic, I have stopped worrying about the demand side. No matter how much the US goes into recession, for any period that is important to any of us, any decline in consumption there will be offset by increased demand elsewhere – in China and India, but also in developing countries that produce their own crude oil. Those countries generally subsidize oil products, and subsidies accelerate demand growth.

At these prices you are seeing some conservation somewhere, but it is being more than offset by increased demand somewhere else. Whether people are still going to be buying at $200 a barrel I don't know, but by the time we get to $200 it will be the supply side that will keep things tight and moving upward.

He didn’t seem to think this was a major global problem, and I wish I had asked why not.

Three Theories: Historically, rapid increases in oil prices have led to global recession. This certainly applies to the stagflation that influenced the decade after the energy crisis of 1973. The terrible recession of 1982 was without doubt related to the energy crisis of 1979-80. And the long, gradual boom that began in ’83 was closely tied to declining oil prices, and accelerated by their collapse in 1986.

What I think we need to ask ourselves is why high oil prices don’t seem to be doing a lot of damage to the global economy. According to The Economist, there are three possible explanations.

An important and interesting idea is that high oil prices are not hurting the economy simply because they themselves are the result of rapid economic growth around the world. “Rather than oil harming the global economy, it is global expansion that is driving up the price of oil” says the world's great champion of liberalism.

Another explanation is that developed economies are more efficient in their use of energy, thanks partly to the increased importance of service industries and the diminished role of manufacturing. For example, the EIA has calculated that the energy intensity of America's GDP fell by 42% between 1980 and 2007.

A third notion is that the oil price rise has been steady, not sudden. This has given the economy time to adjust. The Economist writes, “Giovanni Serio of Goldman Sachs points out that in 1973 there was a severe supply shock because of the oil embargo, when the world had to cope with 10-15% less crude almost overnight. Not this time.” It’s worth adding that during 1979-80, the percentage increases in oil prices were not as great as they were in the early 1970s, but in absolute terms those increases were greater by far.

The Role of Emerging Economies: As Marcel Coutu explained at the beginning of this article, the most important factor for higher prices has been the shift toward greater consumption by developing economies.

The US, for example, has responded to high prices by cutting consumption slightly. According to one source, the decline will be 1.1% this year, such that American consumption next year will be no higher than it was in 2004. Given such a niggardly response, growing demand from China and other emerging markets will be more than enough to offset this shortfall. With supply growth slight to neutral, the steady increase in demand is hauling prices remorselessly higher. It would take a recession in emerging markets to drive commodity prices substantially lower, and to date recession in those economies is not in the cards.

A couple of points deserve comment here. One is that the achievements of Western nations in reducing energy intensity are nothing compared to the achievements of China. According to an excellent paper on China’s energy consumption and demand , since 1980 China’s energy intensity has dropped by about 75% – nearly twice the drop in the US. The reason is that in every way the world's next superpower has become far more efficient.

Of course, I am raising this point because it suggests a very deep irony: Exporting the world’s manufacturing sector to developing countries has not only enabled the West to become a more efficient energy consumer. It has also helped those countries to become more efficient. Don’t blame the Chinese, in other words: They are doing a far better job at using the world’s resources efficiently than the West can even imagine.

Final Thoughts: These ideas, too, hark back to Marcel Coutu’s earlier comments. By subsidizing energy consumption within oil exporting countries, the world is contributing to inefficient energy consumption. Some of the cheapest gasoline prices in the world are in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Venezuela – the last being the all-out winner, with gasoline selling for $0.12 per gallon. The economies of these countries are not known for their gathering efficiency, yet the charts illustrate how much more dramatically oil consumption accelerates when prices are subsidized than when they are not.

The plain truth is that energy importers are subsidizing the inefficient consumption of oil in these countries because of the geographical reality that they have oil to export. Yet the countries we are most anxious about - China and India, for example - are the ones that are increasing their energy consumption not because of large subsidies, but because they are able to provide goods and services with greater energy efficiency than the rest of us.