Showing posts with label Oil reserves. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Oil reserves. Show all posts

Thursday, March 29, 2012

Tallying the Oil Reserves


How Canada made it to number three in the world

This article appears in the April issue of Oilsands Review
By Peter McKenzie-Brown
The issue of how much recoverable oil is in the ground in Canada has been a matter of political and commercial interest since the first surveys undertaken by the Geological Survey of Canada in the 1870s.

American eyes were opened to the true potential in April 2003 at a hearing of the U.S. Senate’s foreign relations committee. Convened to examine international energy security, the committee learned that Canada was an energy superpower. Alberta’s energy regulator had changed its method of calculating oilsands reserves, with the result that booked reserves in Canada suddenly rose from 5 billion to 180 billion barrels.

Canada suddenly stood in second place worldwide after Saudi Arabia. The Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) has since moved Canada into third place by accepting a calculation of Venezuela’s vast extra-heavy crude oil reserves which puts that country at the head of the pack.

No one knows what happened to the eyes of Canadian senators when they heard the first credible estimate of how much oil was in place in the Athabasca area, at a hearing that took place in 1888. The senators were provided with an estimate from R.G. McConnell of the Geological and Natural Survey of Canada.

McConnell’s calculation came from assumptions based on field and lab work: first, there were at least 1,000 square miles of bitumen-saturated sand in the area; second, the sands were 150 to 225 feet thick; third, and this result came from laboratory tests that involved boiling oilsand samples, that the bitumen content averaged 12 per cent by weight. Therefore there were about 30 million “long tons” of bitumen in place—roughly speaking, 220 million barrels. McConnell’s estimate was short by orders of magnitude; to put it in perspective, Canada now consumes about 200 million barrels every three months.

McConnell’s number was an estimate of resources in place, of course, and not a reserves estimate. At that time the very concept of reserves – hydrocarbons that are economically producible at current prices using current technology – was unknown. No one had any idea how to calculate what percentage of oil in the ground would ever see the inside of a pipeline.

Bedevilled engineers
Petroleum engineering gradually emerged as a profession, and engineers soon figured out how to book reserves from conventional oil and gas reservoirs. However, how to calculate oilsands reserves was an issue that bedevilled engineers and geologists for many decades. This led to some curious anomalies.

For example, when the $235 million, 45,000 barrel per day Great Canadian Oil Sands (now Suncor Energy Inc.) plant went on stream in 1967, it represented a substantial investment for the company and soon became a significant contributor to Canadian oil supply. The Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA-now CAPP) booked 6.3 billion barrels of oilsands reserves in its authoritative Statistical Handbook when the project went on stream, but reduced that number to about 1.5 billion in 1975. And when the 140,000 barrel per day, $2.3 billion Syncrude plant went on stream in 1978, the situation became even more absurd: the association didn’t add any new reserves. It was as though the oil was appearing out of nowhere. By the early 1980s a growing number of in situ projects, including Imperial’s Cold Lake activities, made the situation untenable.

According to Hans Maciej, retired vice president of the CPA, in the early 1980s he asked the group’s reserves committee, “‘Where the hell is [the oil] coming from?’ That was quite the discussion,” he recalls.

The committee eventually agreed that they had a problem, but there further endless questions about how to resolve it. “One thing was very easy,” says Maciej. “We could put whatever Great Canadian Oil Sands produced, let’s say it produced a million barrels that year and just add it to reserves – you know, wipe it out. Well that didn’t go very far. [However], after lengthy discussions we decided that we would credit every producing project, and every project that had approval and was sort of certain to go ahead. There was some judgment involved, but we said we would [book their reserves at] 25 times their annual production.” Maciej adds, “This was a very conservative estimate, [but] just to get things going we finally agreed on 25 years.”

CAPP’s reserves committee relies heavily on data provided by its member companies, and the association laboured mightily to stay on top of the country’s burgeoning oilsands reserves, which with special speed during the last 15 years as Syncrude and Suncor expanded, new mines came on stream and in situ projects multiplied.

However, according to CAPP’s research manager, Steve Rodrigues, it became increasingly difficult to get the necessary data from oilsands producers in the last decade – “not because of concerns about revealing competitive information, but because companies increasingly felt that they were not adding value by generating this information.”

One result was that CAPP’s calculation of oilsands reserves – historically, the Canadian standard – now compared to those being calculated by provincial and federal regulators. The numbers presented to the U.S. Senate’s foreign affairs committee were, after all, government numbers, and they were 24 times greater than CAPP’s.

Throwing in the towel
Where did the regulators get their numbers? In a recent presentation, Neil McCrank, who served as chair of the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board until 2007, offered the background. The “new focus on in situ development created a need for the regulators to find new ways of assessing and monitoring these projects…one of the major contributions made by the [regulator] was to recognize the need to re-categorize the in situ bitumen ‘resource’ to a ‘reserve’ where it was proven on the ‘core and cuttings’ analysis to be commercially viable with current technology.”

Bob Taylor, who was then Alberta’s assistant deputy minister for oil development, stresses that the Department of Energy does not play a role in these discussions. However, he says, the information used to recalculate reserves would have been rigorous and the models used would have been mathematically challenging.

“Every leaseholder is obligated to go out and prove up a resource on the basis of one well per section, or the equivalent of one well per section plus some seismic, so it might be one well every couple of sections with seismic lines connecting them so that you can get the stratigraphy. So what [the regulator] did was to have geologists look at each company’s assets,” while examining proven technologies and likely future demand. Using all this information, they created models that could generate highly credible reserves calculations.

Such was the origin of the proved reserves that caused so much excitement in Washington in 2003. According to the McCrank, the announcement of more than 173 billion barrels of oilsands reserves “was initially criticized, but after a stout defence of its scientific approach… the international oil and gas community accepted these reserves calculations.”

So did CAPP. In 2010 the organization threw in the towel as far as using its own method of calculation was concerned. An organization that has celebrated its independence from government since its earliest predecessor was formed in 1927 began using numbers from both Alberta and federal regulators as the basis for calculating oilsands reserves.

The association’s in situ oilsands reserves suddenly jumped by around 2,000 per cent, while its mineable reserves more than tripled. Canada’s industry had caught up with its regulators, and the results were parabolic.

Of course, reserves estimates will never be unanimous. The most widely accepted global authority on energy numbers, BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, most recently puts Canadian oil reserves at 33 billion barrels, or tenth place. Venezuela at 175 billion stood in second place, while Saudi Arabia is the top dog at 264 billion.

We’ve come a long way since 1888, but we still have a way to go.

This article is part of a  series which reflects information from the Petroleum History Society’s current Oil Sands Oral History Project, which is recording the stories of oilsands pioneers in their own words. As with its previous oral history projects, transcripts and recordings will reside in Calgary’s Glenbow Archives. Peter McKenzie-Brown is part of the team of researchers/writers behind the project.

Thursday, February 10, 2011

Tell Your Banker to Buzz Off!


As lines of bank credit grow increasingly restrictive, royalty financing offers new options for operators. This article appears in the February issue of Oilweek
By Peter McKenzie-Brown and Richard Graham

Especially if you’re a natural gas producer, it can be tough to get credit these days. What are you going to do?

One possibility is to do what Compton Petroleum did last spring. Primarily a gas producer, the company sold a 5% royalty interest in 19,000 barrels of oil equivalent (BOEs) production per day, plus a 5% interest in 600,000 undeveloped acres to Caledonian Royalty Corporation, a company founded and managed by oil and gas financier Jim Kinnear.

In a way, royalty financing is filling a gap created by the elimination of energy trusts – at least, that’s what conventional wisdom would like you to think. However, as we researched this story, it became increasingly clear that royalty financing not only meets the needs of investors (especially heavy hitters), but it is also an excellent tool to meet the industry’s needs – natural gas companies like Compton Petroleum, for example, but other companies as well. While the industry traditionally associates the idea of royalties with government take, the new players in this area are promoting it as an effective alternative financing tool. While the jury is still out on whether it will be a preferred form of funding during the next boom, right now it has a lot of merit.

The Olden Days
Royalty funding is not new in Canada’s oil and gas sector, but the industry has to a large extent lost its collective memory of royalty financing. The founder of royalty financing in Canada was R.A. (Bob) Brown who, with his son – also named Bob Brown – later turned Home Oil into a major independent oil company.

During the Great Depression royalty financing played a critical role in the development of Turner Valley – at the time “the biggest oilfield in the British Empire.” On June 16, 1936, Brown senior’s Turner Valley Royalties #1 well began flowing 850 barrels of crude oil per day. Funded by royalty financing which guaranteed investors a percentage production from successful wells, Royalties #1 found Turner Valley’s oil formation two decades after earlier producers began stripping naphtha from wet gas discoveries there. This meant the first generation of producers had wasted much of the pressure needed to produce light oil from the reservoir.

Royalties financed 69 other wells in Turner Valley in the two years following Brown’s discovery. Since only two of those wells were dry, the primary constraint on new investment was the rapid saturation of local crude oil markets.

Royalties financing didn’t last, however. In 1938 the federal government decreed that income from oil production was taxable as profits in the hands of the producing company. In the investor’s hands it was taxed again as income, rather than return of capital. Although a producing company appealed this decision successfully, the incident shook confidence in the system. Indeed, in 1942 Ottawa amended the Income Tax Act to tax oil income from royalty trusts at wartime rates. Although the federal government repealed this provision in 1950, it was 70 years before petroleum royalties again became a significant alternative to traditional debt and equity.

Teams at Play
In recent years, at least four teams have suited up for the royalty game. Each team has its own style of play and a strategy that sounds like a winner. Brickburn Asset Management has the most passive style of play. Range Royalty Management is the brainchild of Clayton Woitas, founder of Renaissance Energy, and effectively combines royalty financing with E&P. Caledonian, founded and controlled by Jim Kinnear, is new while the fourth, Freehold Royalties Ltd. has roots going back to the creation of Canada.

Until it converted to a dividend-paying corporation at the beginning of 2011, Freehold was a publicly listed trust that issued distributions based on a large number of diverse royalty-generating properties (mineral rights and gross overriding royalties) and working interest properties. Its income comes from oil, gas, liquids and potash. Many of its properties are legacy assets – royalty rights which Ottawa granted to railroads and the Hudson’s Bay Company as part of the national effort to secure Western Canada. Freehold has interests in more than two million gross acres of land and 23,000 wells.

In a statement, the company’s president and chief executive officer, Bill Ingram, said that most “of our oil and gas production comes from mineral title lands and gross overriding royalties, which have no associated capital or operating costs; thus we have relatively low capital expenditure requirements. The strength of our royalties has allowed us to preserve a high payout ratio historically and should allow us to maintain a high dividend payout.”

The newest team is that of financier Jim Kinnear, who sees royalty financing as an extension of a common practice in Canada’s mining sector. When he started out in the securities business, says Kinnear, “we invested in small mining syndicates that had acquired claims – money returned plus a carried interest. I learned about returning capital to investors. People liked to see a return of cash or cash flow, and they still do.”

Last year, after retiring from Pengrowth Energy Trust – a business he founded and managed for over 20 years – Kinnear began applying this lesson in finance to oil and gas in an innovative way. So far he and his investors have placed $100 million in Caledonian Royalty Corporation. Their royalty investments – which represent registered interests in land and rank ahead of banks and other creditors – allow qualified investors to participate in cash flow based on production. Caledonian’s royalty interests include current production and potential future production from a large undeveloped land base in Alberta. At present, those assets are heavily weighted towards natural gas.

Range Royalty Management operates rather more like a traditional oil company, but also does financing through the issuance of royalties. The company was not willing to be interviewed for this story, but a source who asked to remain anonymous describes the firm as having “a great technical team. While they always want an overriding royalty, they get at it in a different way. They begin at the grassroots level” – by going to land sales, drilling and frequently operating oil and gas properties. Issuing royalties effectively gives the company financing that bears no interest, doesn’t need to be repaid and is free of commodity price risk.

The Problem with PUDs
Another newcomer to royalty financing is Bill Bonner, president of Brickburn Asset Management. Brickburn manages four partnership funds that invest in royalty interests under the WCSB brand name.

Although he has had a long career in oil and gas financing, Bonner only added royalty financing to his company’s portfolio in 2008. His system is both conservative and traditional. “We raise capital through prospectus,” he explains, “then make that capital available to experienced operators for the completion of development wells. In return, we earn a gross overriding royalty. One way to think about this is that we rent the operator’s wellbores. We are not concerned with any of the traditional costs, including the well’s ultimate abandonment.” He adds, “The sanctity of the royalty position is a very special place to get to.”

Bonner is adamant that royalty financing in its own right is an effective and robust form of finance rather than a replacement for the energy trust. When the oil industry goes into boom mode again, “we think there will still be opportunities for this kind of instrument, although candidly we don’t know for sure.”

He adds that “the main link between us and income trusts is that we pay out capital as we receive it. We provide a stream of income which the investor really likes. We are very much a distribution model as opposed to a model where you retain capital and grow. One of the advantages we have is that our investors get a tax write-off – a 30% Canadian Development Expense, which enables them to write off all of the money they have invested. It just takes time.”

He adds, “We have completed five partnerships totalling $82 million. We only take the money for three years. At that point our prospectuses say we will offer a ‘liquidity event’ to return the capital investment back to the investor. Our game plan is to somehow monetize the property after our investments have gone through a period of flush production – either by selling it outright or by somehow putting it into a going-concern business.”

Brickburn’s first royalty partnership came about in 2008. After the 2006 Halloween Massacre imposed a new tax on energy trusts, he says “it became increasingly difficult for smaller energy businesses to finance growth because for them the liquidation opportunity (selling their assets to energy trusts) had disappeared. So we moved in with this royalty instrument.” Complicating the tax problem was the financial crisis. Traditional sources of equity and debt financing for junior oil and gas companies seemed to have disappeared. Part of the solution was royalty financing.

Brickburn royalty partnerships have participated in more than 70 wells, 95% of which used horizontal multi-frac technology. “One of the reasons operators like us,” according to Bonner, “is that we extend their budgets. If we provide one and a half million dollars for a horizontal well, it frees up that much money for them to go do something else.” Royalties can add to the companies’ bottom lines in other ways, too. One of the main reasons is that operators tend to carry inventories of “proven undeveloped reserves,” or PUDs.

“The problem with PUDs,” says Bonner, “is that you get credit on your balance sheet for them as a proven resource, but now you have to throw a lot of money at them to turn them into developed resource. What we did was to come along and offer operators the opportunity to develop those PUDs in a way that was not dilutive to equity” since royalty interest investments equate to non-repayable loans. “Even though interest rates for the last couple of years have been close to zero, royalty financing is attractive because you don’t have to pay back the principle. When operators began to see this, they quickly realized that taking our capital was very accretive to the capital they had to spend themselves.”

Through its family of funds, Brickburn has acquired royalty interests through 11 operating companies, but is bound by agreement not to mention names. However, Delphi Energy and Bellatrix Exploration have both publically acknowledged that they use royalty financing from Brickburn.

Monday, January 31, 2011

Revolution Repeated


The Western Canada Sedimentary Basin. This article appears in the February issue of Oilweek.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown

First came the revolution in natural gas production – the shift to shale gas which, by bringing huge new stores of natural gas into the market drove prices down and made it necessary to fundamentally restructure Canada’s gas-prone petroleum sector. Now comes the revolution in the oilfield. Ironically, the same technologies that made shale gas possible are enabling the industry to begin the restructuring that the shift to shale gas made necessary.

“Oil doesn’t flow as well as gas,” Legacy Oil & Gas president Trent Yanko reminds us. “So in the oilfields of Alberta, especially, is a tremendous opportunity to recover unproduced oil. Original oil in place was in the billions of barrels, so if you can add only one, two, three percent to recovery there is quite an opportunity. You don’t have to be a wildcatter out in the jungle somewhere. All you have to do is better exploit what we already know is there.”

The technologies that made the shale gas revolution possible are beginning to have a similar impact in the light and conventional oil sector, which can now develop reservoirs that could not be exploited until energy prices and new technologies made production economic. For small companies in particular, this is presenting exceptional opportunities. From start-ups to mid-caps, companies like TriAxon and PetroBakken Energy are creating profitable enterprises from oilfields discovered 50 years ago. Already successful in similar enterprises, Legacy is taking on the big kahuna – the century-old field that put Canada’s petroleum headquarters on the map.
Juniors and the Treadmill

Since it became commonplace in the late 1980s, horizontal drilling has been enhanced by increased drilling efficiency. Much longer horizontal legs are now possible: many are two and three kilometres in length. This is possible because of improvements in bit design, the increasingly effective use of coil tubing and better down-hole motors. Other contributors include geo-steering and increasingly effective measurement-while-drilling (MWD) tools and techniques. Most important of all is multi-stage fracturing. The industry can now isolate many completion zones along lengthy horizontal wellbores: a two-kilometre horizontal leg can host up to 20 hydraulic fractures.

These technologies are making formations like the Bakken viable. Increasingly, the technologies that created the shale gas revolution – long horizontal wells and multistage fracturing – are being applied to aging light oil reservoirs in North America. This production phenomenon has also involved largely unacknowledged regulatory responses by the governments of Western Canada. These factors and other technologies are opening up important new opportunities for production from largely depleted reservoirs. For example, Gary Leach – executive director of SEPAC (the Small Explorers and Producers Association of Canada) – notes that “microseismic for the more precise design of frac jobs is a particularly important new technology.”

A year ago, TriAxon Resources represented a big success story among private junior oil companies. The company was created with what in 2006 was the novel idea of applying the cluster of new technologies to oil production. After screening available prospects, the company focused on the Bakken, Glauconite, Cardium, and Viking formations. The company raised $87 million in private financing; two and a half years later the partners sold out to Crescent Point Energy for $257 million.

Then, according to former president Jeff Saponja, he and his two partners – chief operating officer Colin Flanagan and operations vice president Rob Hari – took a two-week break before establishing TriAxon Oil Corp. – “TriAxon Two,” he calls it.

The opportunities come with a cost, of course. Saponja cautions that those technologies present unique challenges because they are so capital-intensive they. “Fifteen years ago, in the heyday of conventional oil exploration and production, you would put $150,000 to maybe $500,000 into the ground to get 200,000 barrels of oil,” according to Saponja. “Now you have to put maybe $4 million in the ground to get 200,000 barrels of oil, and you have a 50% to 80% initial rate of decline. To get these multistage frac wells to work you have to drill a lot of wells in these lower quality reservoirs.” This leads to what he calls the treadmill.

“To offset decline you have to be continually drilling, because the decline rate is so high. The main point of the equation is that these horizontal wells are very capital-intensive. Initially you get a very high rate of oil production but they will decline quite quickly. The economics are actually fairly marginal on a well to well basis, so you have to drill a lot of wells to benefit from scale. Except in the Bakken,” he says, “Most of these multistage frac wells really struggle if oil prices are below $60 or $70. For these wells to be really profitable, oil has to be over $80 a barrel.”

“You have to be continually drilling to offset decline. It’s called the treadmill. The main point of the equation is that these horizontal wells are very capital-intensive. Initially you get a very high rate of oil production but they will decline quite quickly. The economics are actually fairly marginal on a well-to-well basis, so you have to drill a lot of wells to benefit from scale. Except in the Bakken,” he says, “Most of these multistage frac wells really struggle if oil prices are below $60 or $70. For these wells to be really profitable, oil has to be over $80 a barrel.”

Does it make sense for private companies like TriAxon to stay public? According to Saponja, the economics of staying private are iffy. “These are very expensive wells. For a junior to stay on the treadmill becomes very difficult after you reach 3,000 or 4,000 barrels a day because you need a lot of capital to grow production and combat decline. The challenge that juniors face is that they have to either get their hands on more capital or be prepared to monetize their assets by selling them off. That’s the case for going public: it gives you access to low-cost capital. However, my partners and I are happy building basements, then selling them to the highest bidder.”

Midcaps in the Bakken

The highest bidder for TriAxon One was Crescent Point Energy – one of the two largest players in the Bakken, and the main competitor of PetroBakken, a midcap headed by Gregg Smith. “Our decline rates in the Bakken are about 60% in the first year, so we have to keep drilling to maintain production rates. You have to experiment a lot to be successful in plays like this. When you come into these plays your initial results are going to be mixed, but as you refine your drilling and production systems they improve.”

With considerable satisfaction, Smith notes his company’s success in drilling bilaterals from a single wellpad. “For PetroBakken to drill a single horizontal, the cost is $2.4 million. However, to drill two bilaterals from a single pad costs $3.6 million. It’s much more capital-effective, and it delivers an extra 50,000 barrels per well into the bargain.”

According to SEPAC’s Leach, the obviously improved economics of tighter spacing is generating “a regulatory response. The design of wellpads has to be different, and the new wellpads provide both environmental and economic benefits. Regulators are beginning to respond in all three western provinces.”

He adds, “The Cardium just began to take off in early 2009, and it was SEPAC companies – junior and midsized companies – that set the stage for this. Those sectors are looking to restructure because of the long-term poor prospects for natural gas, and this has played a role in that. It’s really turned around the fortunes of the industry, and generated a lot of investor interest.” With some satisfaction, he notes that multinational companies are coming back to North America to get back into the light and conventional oil resource plays. This involves a turnabout for some companies. for example, Talisman sold off a lot of its Alberta oil production just a few years ago.

PetroBakken’s Smith stresses that the situation in Canada is quite different than that in the United States. The Americans “are drilling shale oil plays. (By contrast) most of the horizontal wells with multistage fraccing in Canada are into reservoirs that were previously simply uneconomic or marginally economic (if you were trying to produce) oil from a vertical well.” This is all changing now, he says. “Now you’re seeing people try to tie up shale oil plays like the Alberta Bakken, the Duvernay and the Nordegg.”

Back to the Future
Of course, old hands in the oil industry are the first to tell you that technology has always been the key factor in expanding production. In fact, in this period of oilfield revolution the importance of technology is more obvious than ever before. According to Legacy president Trent Yanko, “Technology has always been an important part of oilfield development in Canada. I started out in Saskatchewan in 1980s, which was really Canada’s leader in horizontal drilling because of a major government incentive program.” After a few years the industry found itself drilling more horizontals in Saskatchewan than anywhere else in North America – “even the Austin Chalk” in Texas.

“Southeast Saskatchewan has been a classic case of the use of technology to extend the life of reservoirs,” Yanko continues. “Since the 1960s the industry has applied waterflood there, horizontal drilling, CO2 injection and other technologies, each of them extending the life of the province’s south-eastern petroleum reserves. As a result, in the late 1990s oil production matched what everybody thought had been the peak oil levels of 1966, and today the province is at record production.”

Almost all of the reservoirs now being developed with these technologies were discovered after 1947, when the Leduc discovery ushered in the industry’s modern age. Yanko, however, has plans to apply them in the petroleum industry’s birthplace. “Through the acquisition of a private company in July,” he says, “we acquired the Turner Valley oilfield. We control most of the production and all the facilities there.”

To understand Turner Valley’s significance, it’s worth noting that the field’s proximity to Calgary is the reason Canada’s petroleum sector is headquartered in the city. And, as SEPAC’s Gary Leach observes, Calgary now hosts the 45% of the world’s publicly traded oil and gas companies.

As he discusses this property, Trent Yanko becomes palpably excited. “There is still a lot of meat on the bone. There’s been less than 1% decline in (annual) oil production (from Turner Valley) over the last fifty years. The original oil in place was 1.3 billion barrels of 40° oil, and the historical recovery factor to date is only about 12%. So we think it has huge development potential. Before we acquired the property, the last vertical wells were drilled there in the 1940s. There was some horizontal drilling in the 1990s, but the field has been non-core for a long time.”

Although Legacy is proceeding cautiously, its president is thinking big. To begin with, Yanko believes Legacy has mapped a Cardium trend right on top of the field – “11 miles long and about 1½ miles wide,” with 10 metres gross maximum thickness. “In Turner Valley there’s a vertical well that just missed the Cardium and still produced more than 19,000 barrels. Otherwise, that trend hasn’t even been touched.”

“We believe the application of horizontal drilling and multi-stage frac technology can increase the recovery factor,” he adds. “So can infill drilling and reactivation of the waterflood. This property hits a lot of our hot buttons.” In the fall, the company drilled a number of vertical wells into the field. “We are going to frac them, and they will provide a great controlled environment to help us understand the horizons for future horizontal drilling. These wells will help us design that drilling program properly.”

When Turner Valley was first drilled in 1913, it was a wet gas field from which liquids were extracted and natural gas flared. A century later, with conventional gas again a marginally economic commodity, the prize sought in Turner Valley reservoirs is again its hydrocarbon liquids. The difference today is the toolkit.

Friday, March 28, 2008

Colin Campbell and the Cracks of Doom

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
For many peak oil believers, this is the scariest chart you can imagine. The blue lines show historical oil discoveries. The gold lines project discoveries into the future. The line that looks like a rising serpent shows annual production up to about 2005. The chart was created by peak oil guru Colin Campbell in 2004 for a deliciously ironic article titled "The Heart of the Matter". The chart looks like a road map to the Cracks of Doom, and it has been quite influential.

In this column I have frequently provided arguments in favour of peak oil theory, and I am an unabashed admirer of Campbell and his work. However, I believe this chart, though directionally accurate, is simplistic and alarmist. It needs to be nuanced. We can do that in three ways.

• First, note that the blue lines essentially track the world’s new-field discoveries of light and medium oil. The chart suggests that these volumes are the world’s oil reserves. It doesn’t nearly reflect the reserves additions that come through infill drilling, enhanced oil recovery and other standard oilfield practices. By applying simple math to the chart (subtracting production from discoveries), you will come up with world oil reserves far short of the roughly 1.2 trillion barrels that the Energy Information Agency and other authorities have booked.

As they are developed, most discoveries prove to be much bigger than the estimates at time of discovery. This is partly because reserves are a function of economics. When you find a new field you calculate its reserves based on present conditions and price forecasts – say, in 1970, $2.50 per barrel into the foreseeable future. As prices rise relative to costs, you will get more oil out of that field – of that you can be sure.

The thinking by which M. King Hubbert forecast the year of peak oil production in the United States was incredibly successful. What is rarely discussed, though, is that Hubbert underestimated by about 50 per cent the amount of oil that would be available in the US after it reached the peak. To a large extent this was because new reserves became available through changing technologies and more favourable petroleum economics.

• Second, give heavy oil, bitumen and oil shale the credit they deserve. Because of the nature of the beast, these unconventional resources are not booked as reserves until they become economically and technically producible.

Alberta’s huge oil sands are a classic example. In 2005 America’s Energy Information Agency booked Canadian oil reserves as second in the world (after Saudi Arabia) because of the impact of higher prices and improved technologies on the oil sands. If that amount of oil – 174 billion barrels (174 gigabarrels) – were added to the gold-coloured reserves lines on Campbell’s chart, it would require a line that would tower over the rest of the chart by a factor of three. Campbell’s methodology does not account for this kind of event. And in all likelihood, much more of the oilsands will eventually be booked as reserves.

That point takes me to this chart (click to enlarge), which is also from Campbell’s article. The black wedge – characterized as “Heavy, etc.” in the legend – is his estimate of the contribution of heavy oil to the global energy liquids picture. Eyeballing suggests that he expected these unconventional resources to be about 4.5 million barrels per day by now, world-wide.

Heavy oil, synthetic oil and non-upgraded bitumen represent about two million barrels of production per day in Canada alone, and Venezuela and Mexico are also big producers. What’s more, Canada’s oil industry is working hard to develop export markets for heavy oil, because there is a great deal more production yet to develop. Indeed, Canadian producers are selling their heavy oil at a discount because they cannot get it to world markets.

According to one excellent and credible report, seven years from now Alberta alone will be producing about three million barrels per day of “Heavy, etc.” That estimate risks production for economic and environmental obstacles, so it is probably low.

• Third – and this is my main point – let’s acknowledge that the serpent-like production line in Campbell’s chart, while it is not a happy sign, is not the spectre of doom it appears. The world’s unconventional resources will greatly blunt the blow – relative to the steep declines described in Campbell’s chart, in any event.

One amazing feature of the oil sands is their incredible energy density. Imperial Oil’s Cold Lake bitumen plant, for example, is a tiny dot on the map of Alberta, yet it produces 6 per cent of Canada’s oil. The resource density of these unconventional resources is immense, and that density is what makes it such an important resource. The world is heading toward capital-intensive, technology-intensive, pollution-intensive and energy-intensive energy - bitumen from Cold Lake, for example.

The greater the capital intensity, though, the lower the geopolitical risk must be. Keep that in mind when you consider development prospects for Venezuela’s Orinoco heavy oil belt, which is so huge it rivals the resources of Canada. The geopolitical risks in that country are enormous, so the likelihood is small that new Venezuelan supplies will soon hit world markets.

Strongman Hugo Chavez is increasingly unpopular in his own country, however, and the economy is in disarray. Oil production is in decline even though the the country has the largest conventional reserves in this hemisphere. Given that situation, it is possible to imagine a post-Chavez Venezuela which will develop those resources and become a resurgent supplier to the world. If that happened, it would lead to another super spike in booked reserves.

I share the view that a global Hubbert’s peak is nigh. The world is facing serious energy supply problems, and they are related to peak oil. To too great a degree, however, the discussion has failed to recognize the immensity and importance of the world’s unconventional sources of oil. Those vital resources will radically change the shape of the chart as they are plotted into it.
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