One Man, Immeasurable Impact

How J. Howard Pew's intense and unwavering belief in the oil sands created an industry.

This article appears in the August issue of Oilsands Review 

By Peter McKenzie-Brown

If he is remembered at all, Americans interested in business history think of J. Howard Pew as an industrialist who created what was once one of the world’s largest energy companies. For Canadians, though, he was the legendary force behind the harnessing of the oilsands. Though his efforts in the oilsands sector were a cash drain for his company – at the time, one of the 20 largest in the United States – for this country he created an industry.

The thumbnail sketch of his life is this: Born in 1882, J. Howard Pew graduated from high school at age 14, from university at 18 and became president of Sun Oil at age 30. With his brother Joseph he transformed Sun (founded by his father; now called Sunoco) by introducing new refining, marketing, and distribution techniques. He was astute. During the First World War he responded to the war-time demand for crude by building a navy of tankers. That fleet became one of Sun’s most profitable businesses.

A publication celebrating Sun Oil’s centenary in 1986 described the man, who had died in 1971. “Tall and broad-shouldered, with bushy eyebrows, he was often seen clutching an enormous cigar in his fingers as he moved about Sun’s corridors. He was intense, sure of himself and deliberate in his speech even in old age.”

The Venerable Pew: An extreme conservative in his religious and political views, Pew was passionate about his work. “Working for Sun Company these years has been not merely a job,” he said in 1956. “It has been participation in an exciting adventure – a way of life providing satisfaction in the accomplishment of our goals. So our people have become a great team, welded together by great ideals and purposes accepted by each of us.”

In the 1940s the venerable Pew took a serious interest in the oilsands, in part because of an investigation of potential crude oil sources Sun undertook during the Second World War. In the early 1950s, George Dunlap had a remarkable interview with Pew before moving to Calgary to set up Sun’s Canadian exploration and production operations.

“I have one area that I am interested in and would like to share with you my interest,” Pew told him. He went to a cabinet to pull out a thick file marked “Athabasca Tar Sands,” then shared his vision of the future importance of the oilsands. He told Dunlap to ensure that “Sun Oil always has a ‘significant position’ in the Athabasca Tar Sands area!”

The venture was called Great Canadian Oil Sands Limited (now the Suncor plant), and in 1962 the Oil and Gas Conservation Board (today the ERCB) granted approval for the company to proceed with a 31,500 barrel-per-day, $122 million plant, but imposed severe environmental restrictions on the plant. The partners had serious concerns about economies of scale for such a small project. Costs began to rise and financial difficulties ensued. By 1964 it was clear that a company with deep pockets – not Canadian Oil Sands Ltd. – was needed to lead GCOS. Sun took on that responsibility. The capacity of the proposed plant increased to 45,000 barrels per day and the cost escalated from $122 to $190 million.

The larger plant received approval in 1964, partly because Pew wrote a letter to the Petroleum Resources Conservation Board (now the ERCB) saying “I believe in the future of this project and I will put up my own money without reservations if the permit is approved.” Read aloud at a meeting of the Conservation Board, that letter carried the day. By the time GCOS reached completion in 1967, costs had risen to $235 million.

Building the Plant: The contractor for the project was Bechtel of Canada, and the engineer representing Sun during construction was Robert (Bob) McClements, Jr., who later became chairman and CEO of Sun Oil. McClements described Pew as “one of the strongest influences on my life.”

Pew would visit the construction site and “we would have engineering (and other) discussions. He would ask ‘How much does it cost to feed a man an average twelve hours on a shift?’ He was very, very detailed. I still remember: it was six to eight pounds of food per person per day and a little less than $2.00 per person to feed a construction worker… Anyway, there was a side of J. Howard that I don’t think has really been widely recognized. I think many people would describe him first perhaps as an industrialist. He was certainly known as the leader of a large corporation. Sun was always in the top 20 of the Forbes list of companies. It was a huge company. But there was also a spiritual side to him. He was a very religious individual. His conversations often included two words: faith and freedom, and they were welded together….”

The Sun Company McClements joined in the 1960s was much different from those in today’s oilpatch. “There was no retirement plan, there was no healthcare plan, there was no sick plan. When you were sick, you took your own time off….You would pay for that time. When you retired – and nobody quit and nobody was ever fired at the Sun Company – you retired at 50% of your pay. There were no documents explaining this in those days.”

McClements described the only meeting he attended between Pew and Premier Ernest Manning. “I’m telling you I’ve never been in a business meeting in my life like that. It was like you and me sitting here talking. There were no hard specifics. (There) was a feeling of absolute trust between the two of them. And I remember when I went back to the plant, somebody asked me about it. Without thinking, I said ‘Those two men just reeked with honesty.’ The relationship they had was unbelievable, exactly the same wavelength.”

McClements served as master of ceremonies at the official GCOS opening. A Sun Company publication commemorating the event quoted him as saying “synthetic crude is a natural for petrochemicals. I see no reason why the stretch along the Athabasca (river) cannot become an industrial valley in time.”

McClements vividly remembered the official opening. “It was the end of September in 1967 at the dedication of the plant. Pouring rain, not a very good day at all.” Premier Ernest Manning and Pew (then 85 years old) both addressed the audience of about 200.

According to Manning, “no other event in Canada’s centennial year is more important or significant.… It is fitting that we are gathered here today to dedicate this plant not merely to the production of oil but to the continual progress and enrichment of mankind.” For his part, Pew told the assembly that “No nation can long be secure in this atomic age unless it be amply supplied with petroleum. It is the considered opinion of our group that if the North American continent is to produce the oil to meet its requirements in the years ahead, oil from the Athabasca area must of necessity play an important role.”

McClements, who was the first plant manager for GCOS, recalled a tour he gave Pew once production had begun. “We had visited the mine and were in the refining section of the plant (when he) asked to see a sample of what we were running and I asked an engineer to pull a sample of the product we were making at the moment. Mr. Pew took the bottle and held it up to the light. It was water white. He unscrewed the cap, held one nostril and sniffed the oil again. Finally, he stuck his finger in the bottle and tasted the oil. When he did, you could just see his face beam.”

A broad view of the GCOS story comes from Paul Chastko, a renowned oilsands historian. “When Great Canadian Oil Sands began production in 1968, it represented a remarkable achievement,” he wrote: “a Canadian company, backed by the investment capital of a U.S. multinational corporation, used a separation process researched and developed by scientists funded by the governments of Canada and Alberta to produce a synthetic oil capable of competing against conventional Saudi crude in world oil markets.” All true, but the energy behind this effort was the vision of J. Howard Pew. The impact on the oilsands of this one man has been immeasurable.

The Captain Takes a Bow

Suncor Energy starts the long goodbye to Rick George, the man who built it from broken to megaweight

This article appears in the February issue of Oilsands Review; photo from here

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
Bob McClements has had a long association with the oilsands industry. He was construction manager for Sun Oil Company’s (Sunoco) original Great Canadian Oil Sands plant and the first plant manager when it went on stream in 1967. When it commissioned that pioneering plant, Sunoco was one of the largest integrated oil companies in the world. In the 1980s McClements rose to its highest ranks, becoming president and chief executive officer.

When Sunoco was near the top of its game, McClements asked American-born Rick George—who at the time was in charge of Sunoco’s North Sea development and production, and had overseen construction of Europe’s first purpose-built offshore production platform—to take charge of the company’s Canadian subsidiary, Suncor Energy Inc.

“I flew over to London and asked him whether he would give up his position with an established operation in the UK and move to a totally different environment in Canada. After only a day, he agreed,” says McClements. “You have never met a more unassuming, low-key but brilliant executive in your life. He’s quiet and unassuming, but when he speaks you listen. He knows what he’s doing because he came up the ranks. He was given increasing responsibilities and he did well in every one of them.”

Headquartered in Toronto until 1995, George became Suncor’s president and chief operating officer in 1990; the following year the board appointed him chief executive officer. Also in 1991, McClements retired and Sunoco accelerated its policy of divesting upstream assets so it could focus instead on refining and marketing. Accordingly, it spun off Suncor as an independent entity.

Big mistake: Suncor had market capitalization of $1 billion when George took over. Today it’s about 48 times bigger, and 12 times larger than Sunoco. Rick George, who recently announced that he will fully retire at the end of July, was the architect of this spectacular business achievement. In his years at the helm of Suncor, McClements said with some understatement, “he has become the number one executive in the oilsands.”

Why did its owners divest Suncor? According to George, “We were actually going through a recession back in 1991-92, both here in North America and in Europe. It was a period of time at which the Government of Ontario [75 per cent owner] was struggling with paying their bills. This was an area they could liquidate. Sun Company had some issues around debt as well. It was just fortunate that both of them actually needed money at the time and decided to sell Suncor to the public.”

When George took over, Suncor’s primary assets included the money-losing oilsands plant, some service stations and a small refinery in Ontario. The oilsands business “really struggled with return on capital well into the mid-1990s [because of] high costs relative to low oil prices,” George said in a recent interview conducted for the Petroleum History Society’s Oil Sands Oral History Project. “There were 20–25 years of real struggle between when this industry got its first plant online and when it actually started to make enough money to make sense.”

Building an oilsands heavyweight
Assisted in the early years by Dee Marcoux, executive vice-president, oilsands, the first items of business during George’s presidency were to restructure the 60,000-barrel-per-day plant, deploy truck-and-shovel technology for mining, make major improvements to the processing plant, and expand capacity to 130,000 barrels per day by 2001.

In 1998 Suncor filed its regulatory application for Project Millennium, comprised of mining capacity increases and a new upgrader. The project was a dramatic expansion designed to increase production to 210,000 barrels per day. George recalls that, “about the time our board approved the Millennium Project, which was 1997, The Economist had a front page view that they expected prices to be at $5.00 a barrel for a long period of time…I think what they lost track of is that this industry moves through cycles and it will continue to roll through cycles as we invest, as we try to figure out where the next investments should be.”

Millennium was a good investment, he added. “We started the project when there were low oil prices. When we got the project done in 2002, oil prices rose and it was obviously a great win for our shareholders. I always think of oil companies as big deployers of capital. And I think the management and leadership of oil companies is really about making right choices at the right time.”

In 2001, Suncor announced its Voyageur growth strategy, a multi-pronged approach targeted to bring oilsands production to 500,000 barrels per day by 2012. The plan included a mine extension, third upgrader, and in situ expansions at the Firebag steam assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) project. The Voyageur strategy was slowed by the global recession, but not derailed. Its most significant piece, the Voyageur upgrader—now a joint venture with Total E&P Canada—is expected to be re-sanctioned in the near-term. George says the upgrader should reduce business volatility. “It should improve reliability. It’s going to be a project that will be online for 50 to 100 years…you’ve got to take a very long-term view of this business.”

And that long-term view rests a lot on in situ development. In addition to undeveloped leases and the MacKay River SAGD project acquired through Suncor’s 2009 merger with Petro-Canada, Suncor considers its Firebag assets to be a key piece of the future. “Firebag is in the middle of a lease we hold that has 9 billion barrels of recoverable oil,” George says. “So this is again an asset base that will be on production for the next hundred years in some form or another.”

Putting assets together
In 2009, George announced a $19.1-billion bid to take over Petro-Canada. With the merger’s success, Suncor suddenly had a much bigger refining and marketing presence in Canada, light oil and gas properties around the world and significant additional oilsands properties.

“If you look at it in a historic sense, we picked Petro-Canada off at the low point of the market, or pretty close to that,” he says. “I’d thought for a period of time about putting the assets together, particularly their downstream with our upgrading and our upstream made a lot of sense. The opportunity to drive synergies, to drive costs out the system—all of that was there in spades. I think it was a great move, made at the right time. And, you know, most mergers actually don’t drive shareholder value. This is one that did.”

George is competitive when it comes to production systems and oilsands technology, but collaborative on environmental issues. As one of the founders of the Oil Sands Leadership Initiative, he believes the industry should share “anything to do with safety, the environment, environmental improvement, anything on reducing our air, land and water footprints. This is important, very important.”

On the future of the oilsands sector
George says that even though he has been at the helm of Suncor for 20 years, the real excitement is yet to come.

“I think the next ten years in this industry are going to be some of its best,” he said, pointing specifically to technology around reducing the environmental footprint of operations. “It is going to astound people how quickly this happens and how well it happens.”

The step-changes will come particularly in the in situ area, he says. “The important thing to remember about SAGD is that is still a very, very young industry. [You’re going to see] a real take-off because of the critical mass of investment in technologies that will rapidly change how we do this. It will reduce water use. It will reduce energy intensity. It will make wells more productive. As wells get to the end of their life, we’ll figure out ways to extend that and recover more.”

George continues, “Listen, industry is looking at all kinds of ways to [improve efficiency], whether it’s use of solvents, surfactants, better downhole pumps, whether you eventually, once you get these caverns, use fire-flood. There are so many technologies out there that are being looked at, being researched, being tried in the field, you’re going to see this thing change rapidly, particularly over the next decade or so. It’s actually quite exciting.”

Suncor’s production has grown significantly under George’s leadership, and will continue as part of his enduring legacy. In the longer term, he notes that the company will “have production coming in from Fort Hills, eventually Joslyn, but also from Firebag, from MacKay River, from our two base mines. And this will feed this large upgrading complex that includes upgrader number one [constructed in 1967], upgrader number two (from the Millennium Project) and upgrader three which is Voyageur. The total capacity of that upgrading facility will be somewhere in the 550,000-barrel-a-day range.”

George leaves behind a strategic plan for Suncor to produce 1 million barrels per day by 2020. “We have the reserves to do it, the strategy to do it, and the environmental approvals for the projects. It’s really down to execution.”

On a cautionary note, he noted some worries the industry should think about.

“You’ve got to be very concerned right now about whether we have enough labour in this part of Alberta. The one difficult thing we have is this oilsands resource in a very remote area. You don’t have a nearby port, you have to bring everything in by truck or by rail. You always have to worry about these inflationary cycles, that we have seen and that we’re likely to see on a go-forward basis. So we just came through a big inflationary period, that 2005 and 2008 period. It’s been calm since the market collapsed in 2008 but…”

George’s final year in the company saw record production, record cash flow and earnings, and total debt way down, to $7 billion. Twenty years ago, could he have imagined that Suncor would become the largest oil company in North America?

“No. That would have been the most improbable thing. But you know what? It’s been an exciting ride. What I would say is, the potential to do those kinds of things is still out there. If I were, you know, 20 years or 30 years younger than I am today…. Opportunities still exist to do those kinds of things.”

Rick George will continue to innovate and lead. As he told the press when he announced his retirement, he won’t be leaving the sector. He’ll still be involved with the oilsands and technology development, but through smaller companies.

Waste to Wealth

Why waste management in the oilsands could better echo the mutually beneficial relationships in nature. This article appears in the August issue of The Oilsands Review.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
Academics have developed a discipline known as industrial ecology to help explain the behaviour of the economic world, but you can do more than use this discipline to understand economics. You can use it for strategic planning. According to an influential group of thinkers headquartered in Alberta, the future of the oil sands lies in “industrial symbiosis” – a specialty within the field. It’s a simple idea, but it could have the power to transform the oil sands sector.

A few months ago I got an invitation to participate in a workshop developing this idea, with a key proviso: If I reported on the proceedings, I couldn’t attribute a quote to anyone without first getting permission. The point was to create a working environment in which no one felt constrained by the presence of a reporter. No problem: for this article, the ideas are more important than the industry, government, and university people behind them.

The workshop was jointly sponsored by ConocoPhillips and Alberta Innovates, an umbrella group of provincial agencies meant to be “catalysts of innovation” in the energy and environment, health, technology and bio sectors.

We met at the provincial government’s McDougall Centre in Calgary. While the topic was zero waste from the oil sands, participants produced the usual amount of think-tank rubbish in the form of Styrofoam cups and disposable plastics. Probably nothing was recycled – one of the easy forms of waste management.

The task set before the group was to brainstorm a plan for regional integration in the Fort McMurray area. Under this scheme, industry and government would look for ways to encourage the creation of waste-reducing business ties. Oil sands companies, other industries and municipalities in the region would share or co-locate infrastructure to reduce redundancy, harness waste energy and convert residual materials into value-added by-products.

The Big Word
To understand this, let’s get the big word out of the way. Symbiosis occurs when living things develop cooperative or dependent relationships with others so they can live longer or better and prosper. Familiar examples: people on the one side, cultivated plants and domesticated animals on the other. Each side needs the other to thrive.

Industrial ecology describes industries as ecosystems with behaviours somewhat similar to those in nature. Industrial symbiosis involves creating dependent or cooperative relationships within the sector. Done right, this approach can create more sophisticated, efficient and profitable businesses. It can also reduce the output of such industrial wastes as heat, carbon dioxide emissions, and other pollutants.

There are many instances of companies extracting by-products from a waste stream and then transforming them into money-making products. For example, Williams Energy Canada removes pentanes, butanes, propane and olefins from the off-gas stream at Suncor’s Fort McMurray operations. The company pipes the butanes and olefins to Redwater, where its 14,000-barrel-per-day plant further processes them into petrochemical feedstock. In May Williams announced a series of expansions to this system, including the construction of more processing facilities and a new pipeline.

Another example is the fertiliser plant at Syncrude, which helps the oil sands giant comply with environmental regulations. Marsulex Inc. owns and operates the plant which, using technology the fertiliser company developed, employs waste ammonia from Syncrude to help clean up sulphur emissions from bitumen processing and upgrading. The value-added by-product from the operation is ammonium sulphate fertilizer.

Similarly, Shell strips feedstock from the hydrocarbon stream at its oil sands upgrader at Scotford. The company pipes those by-products to its nearby petrochemicals plant for feedstock.

Looking into the future, Edmonton-based Titanium Corporation has developed an entire business plan based on processing waste oil sands material into valuable products. The company has developed technology that can recover both heavy minerals (zircon and titanium) and bitumen from tailings ponds at Fort McMurray-area plants.

There are economic and environmental benefits to this approach. Companies can generate profits for their shareholders. The environmental footprint is smaller, because symbiosis enables industrial players to manage emissions and other waste streams better. And there are improvements in the economics of transforming low-cost bitumen into higher-value products. It seems like a no-brainer.

The Toilet and the Tailings Pond
Over two days, workshop discussion was thoughtful and varied, and it included colourful one-liners enlivening subtle and colourful ideas. One person summed up a complex discussion with an on-the-spot maxim: “Don’t connect the toilet to the tailings pond.” The idea is that the plumbing should be designed to easily redirect plant by-products (including waste heat) to new facilities as money-making uses for them are found.

Co-author of an executive primer titled Discovering Industrial Ecology, the University of Alberta’s Dr. Stephen Moran suggested that companies should “assign to each major waste a product number, then assign a product manager to it.” An important outcome of that perception-altering idea would be the creation of markets for valuable wastes. Syncrude’s waste ammonia is one good example. Another: the propane and heavier hydrocarbons which Suncor used for plant fuel until Williams began to extract them for feedstock.

At the other end of the feedstock spectrum, consider that ERCB regulations now require the companies drilling Steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD) oil sands wells to send all materials from the well, including oil sands from the horizontal legs, to a secure landfill. Why not treat that material as oil sands ore and ship it instead to a mining operation for processing?

According to Bob Taylor – formerly Alberta’s Assistant Deputy Minister for Oil and now a consultant who specializes in energy systems innovation – all manner of coordination is possible. If several facilities coordinate their waste management operations, there will be fewer garbage trucks barrelling down the road. What about gasifying solid waste produced by field camps along with suitable regional waste, including slash from woodland operations? He also suggests a regional water strategy that “seeks to utilize this limited resource to support a much higher level of development and production than if we continue down the current path.” Taylor sees co-generation as another important area of opportunity. For example, waste heat from generating electricity could produce steam for cyclic steam stimulation (CSS) or SAGD operations.

There are also opportunities in assets external to the oil sands – infrastructure like roads and highways, the power grid and an often-discussed railway link to Fort McMurray. According to Taylor, “engaging parties beyond our normal spheres of influence (will help us) realize (symbiotic) opportunities that will enable our industry to better meet social and profit expectations alike.” The ideas got increasingly complex, and it quickly became clear that the potential is huge.

Triangles
One appeal of waste management through industrial symbiosis is that it contributes positively to three of society’s broadest concerns: economic growth, stewardship of the environment and efficient energy consumption. Take the Williams off-gases project, which strips heavier hydrocarbons from Suncor’s fuel stream. This industrial magic enables the plant to operate more efficiently, reduces Suncor’s carbon dioxide emissions and provides feedstock to the petrochemical industry. Not a bad outcome for a single piece of innovation.

A participant noted with some surprise that the environmental footprint is triangular in shape, with its three sides consisting of land, air and water. “What you do to change results in one of these areas affects results in the others.”

In that context, the goal of zero waste from the oil sands can act as a principle to help the industry overcome the public perception of the industry’s behaviour by directly addressing the issue. It will also provide guidance to the build-out of the industry. Forecasts suggest that three quarters of the plants that will dot the oil sands in 2030 are yet to be built. These facilities are still at the concept or design stage, and they represent the biggest opportunity to embrace industrial symbiosis. Notably, they will be receiving the greatest scrutiny from regulators and a public demanding “greener” energy.

Another triangle is driving oil sands development. Its three sides are social attitudes and demands; regulatory and industrial codes; and technical skills and operating environments. As in the case of the footprint triangle, what you do to change results in one of these areas affects results in the others. In the area of technical skills and operating environments, there’s a triangle of areas where industry players need to look for improvements.

According to Dr. Doug James, who with Bob Taylor facilitated the workshop, one is “inside the plant fence.” Individual operations need to seek out better processes for cleaning up or eliminating waste generation. These could include capturing and using waste heat, for example, and using waste materials for gasification. Joy Romero, Canadian Natural’s vice president of bitumen production, cited a process at Horizon which “purchases waste CO2 to add to our tailings. This undoes the effect of caustic soda, allowing fines and clays to settle, and water is released for reuse almost immediately from the tailings ponds.”

There are also “across the plant fence” opportunities, by which different companies work together to make their combined operations more efficient. For example, they could build joint facilities for water treatment and waste water handling or develop joint hydrogen production facilities – perhaps using gasification of coal and biomass – for use in upgraders.

And there are opportunities from “across-the-region coordination” – the construction of common pipelines and other transportation infrastructure. One possibility would be regional landscape planning with Alberta-Pacific Forest Industries, which has forestry rights covering most of the oil sands area. This “might reduce the joint forestry-SAGD footprint by 30%,” said James.

Tragedy of the Commons
In a presentation, Dr. Eddy Isaacs of Alberta Innovates described a 90-year pattern of oil sands development. His essential argument was that oil sands development periodically goes into crisis before being rescued by a visionary. Sunoco Chairman J. Howard Pew saved a floundering Suncor, for example, and Frank Spragins, the first president of Syncrude, brought that project back from a near-death experience.

The oil sands are now in crisis because of public perceptions. According to one academic, “Perception is reality and the perception is that you guys are making a mess up there. You’ve got a problem.” Dr. Soheil Asgarpour, president of the Petroleum Technology Association of Canada, agreed. “We aren’t communicating what we are doing properly,” he said, “and we aren’t doing enough.”

According to facilitator Bob Taylor, industrial symbiosis is a key part of the solution, since it harnesses economic forces to reduce waste and save energy. The best part of this system, though, is that it develops naturally. Symbiotic relationships began forming long before the idea was coined.

In Alberta, the classic example is the Industrial Heartland, north of Edmonton. That industrial region has grown organically since the late 1940s, when Imperial Oil brought a tin-pot World War II refinery down from Whitehorse in response to the discovery of oil near Edmonton. Not until recently was the idea of industrial symbiosis even whispered there. Now reflecting more than $25 billion in investment, this 582-square-kilometre region hosts forty large companies and many small ones. Together they operate numerous refineries and plants, pipelines, fabricating facilities, service companies and other interdependent businesses.

For the oil sands, there is no reasonable alternative to greater and continually evolving industrial symbiosis. In a background document, Bob Taylor and Doug James suggested that the extreme alternative to a sensibly industrial ecology is reflected in a notion known as “the tragedy of the commons.” The phrase was first articulated in an influential 1968 article by the late Dr. Garrett Hardin, an academic whose First Law of Ecology proclaims, “You cannot do only one thing.”

In his famous article, Hardin described a situation in which individuals act independently and rationally in their own self-interest. Collectively, however, they deplete a shared, limited resource even when it is clear that it is in no one’s long-term interest to do so.

To illustrate his point, Hardin proposed a hypothetical and simplified situation based on land tenure in medieval Europe. The picture he drew was one of herders sharing a common pasture for their cows. It is in each herder’s personal interest to put the next (and succeeding) cows he acquires onto the land, even if this means exceeding its carrying capacity and temporarily or permanently damaging the land. The herder receives all of the benefits from an additional cow, while the damage to the common is shared by the entire group. If all herders make this individually rational economic decision, the common pasture will be depleted to the detriment of everyone.

Society is now much more complex than in medieval times, of course, and today’s petroleum sector clearly understands that permission to produce Alberta’s resources requires public approval. Oil sands people at the workshop frequently mentioned the need to “preserve your social license.”

“The implication for the oil sands industry,” wrote the two workshop facilitators, “is that, in the absence of a higher guiding principle, each company will tend to act in its own interests, ultimately resulting in degradation of the environment. Of course, the government through regulations imposes such higher guiding principles. However, it appears at this time that the rapid expansion of the industry operating on an individual basis reaches sub-optimal results regarding environmental stewardship.”

One way for industry to demonstrate better stewardship is to collectively develop good will by sharing new, lower-waste technologies. It is important for companies to secure intellectual property rights for their ideas. If they didn’t, someone else could secure the patent and demand royalties on the technology. However, producers have little reason not to share them within the oil sands community. After all, said Doug James, “in the oil sands once you acquire your land the competition is over. Compared to the revenue stream from oil sands production, any income you might derive from licensing production technology is peanuts.”

Moving toward zero as a goal will reduce waste products, he said, but it will also reduce “wasted opportunities, wasted human capital, wasted funds and wasted reputations.”

He Rocks

 Former "coker rat" Byron Lutes plays the guitar, rides a longboard and - oh, yeah - is leading a serious oilsands contender

This article appears in the August issue of Oilweek.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
I didn’t expect the answer Byron Lutes gave me when I asked what kinds of books he reads. “I read a lot,” he said. “Just last night I finished When Giants Walked the Earth, by Mick Wall. It’s a biography of Led Zeppelin. It was great.” The choice surprised me. As we talked, however, the title seemed increasingly fitting. Surely if there’s an industry dominated by giants it’s the oilsands, yet here’s a guy leading a small company who wants to become a leader in the game.

Lutes has a ready smile and a lot of confidence in what he’s doing – turning the two-bit shell of a VSX (Venture Stock Exchange) company into a serious oilsands contender.

A chemical engineer by background, the athletic president and chief executive officer of Southern Pacific Resource Corp. graduated from the University of Calgary in mid-1986, just as oil prices collapsed from $30 per barrel to $10 and layoffs within the industry became the order of the day. “Only two of about 50 graduates in my chemical class got jobs after graduation.” Byron Lutes was one of them. As a student he’d worked at Suncor during previous summers, and the company wanted to keep him on.

Instead of getting the typical new hire’s tour of the company, though, he found himself working for Suncor just as it became immersed in labour strife. Employees at the oilsands plant had gone on strike, and he was shipped off to Fort McMurray to help operate the upgrader. “I was a coker rat,” he says. “I was swinging valves and cutting coke. It was a dirty job – all-night shifts – but I loved it because I got to learn a lot coming right out of school. I spent eight years at Suncor, doing various things. I did reservoir engineering and a year and a half stint in marketing. It was a terrific company to work for, and I got a lot of great experience.”

When he was 30, Lutes’ romance with junior oils was about to begin. “One of my former bosses, Sid Dykstra, had set up a company called Newport Energy and he asked me to join him. The company was making about 2,200 barrels of oil a day. Over the next seven years we grew it to about 30,000 and then sold out to Hunt Oil.” He stayed with Hunt for the next three years, running their Canadian operations. “That was a complete change, going from a grassroots, publically traded Canadian company to a private, very large American one. I knew I wasn’t going to stay.”

In 2002 he went to work for ManCal Energy, a privately-held company owned by Calgary’s Mannix family. “We were always growing stuff, developing it and selling it to take a profit. That was part of our game plan. We didn’t want to build up the staff complement, which was about 20 people. ManCal was another really good company to work for.”
 
Food chain
After five years with ManCal, Dave Antony – the chair of Southern Pacific Resource Corp – approached Lutes “out of the blue” to run the company. “It’s been quite a ride. (The company) had a bunch of land in the oilsands and some exploration programs, and they needed someone to come in and lead it.”

Though the oilsands are an area where giants generally do walk the earth, Lutes sees a lot of opportunity for junior oilsands companies. “Smaller companies can move their projects forward faster, from a regulatory, financial, and execution standpoint,” he says. “They can exploit areas that a larger company may have overlooked. They (can) attract and retain top entrepreneurial expertise. There will always be room for different sizes, as in any industry, and the food chain will also likely always be there.”

The story of the resurrection of Southern Pacific illustrates two quite different business models that are part of the industry’s food chain. The company, which has an undistinguished pedigree, was first traded on the old Vancouver Stock Exchange as New Wellington Mines Limited, in 1953. According to Lutes, “Dave (Antony) and his associates find shell companies, clean them up, recapitalize them and put in a management team.” That’s one part of the food chain.

A private company known as Bounty Developments Ltd. illustrates another. Bounty’s “modus operandi is to get land positions and turn them over to another company, keeping an override on the land. They’ve been very successful with that. We made a deal with them, met some work commitments and acquired 219 square miles of land (sections) in the oilsands, most of it raw acreage. We earned an 80 per cent interest in the property.” Southern Pacific has since expanded its oilsands acreage, and now has an average 81 per cent working interest in 301 sections.

To play in the oilsands you need lots of money, and institutional investors in particular won’t touch a company listed on the Venture Exchange – too much risk. Southern Pacific needed to move to the Toronto Stock Exchange, and that required cash flow.

To get there, the company issued equity and took on debt to acquire Senlac, a Saskatchewan heavy oil property producing 5,000 barrels per day. The price was $90 million. “As soon as we had that we were a going concern, and it enabled us to advance to the TSX. That means more due diligence, but a lot more investors now will put their money into the company.” The company began trading on the TSX in June.

SAGD-able
To look to the company’s future, you need to first look a bit deeper into its recent past. When Lutes took on the president’s role at the beginning of 2008, the boom was still around, although it had been soured by Premier Stelmach’s ill-considered and now largely defunct “fair share” royalty revisions.

“When I first joined we were getting ready to start up a major winter drilling program. The company had in the neighbourhood of $60 million in the bank, and we had a lot of core holes to drill but the market was getting choppy. So we were lucky enough – and (chairman) Dave (Antony) was smart enough – to realize it may not be easy to raise equity in the market, so we really conserved our cash.” Lutes pulls out a map. “We cut back on our drilling program but were lucky enough to find in this McKay block a significant resource that we thought could support a good SAGD project. We focused and drilled into this area and found ourselves a project.”

The company’s first oilsands production will come from two pieces of land separated by the McKay River. Especially when he talks about the first of these properties, Lutes gets visibly excited. “It’s a great property to sink our teeth into as our first green-field Athabasca bitumen SAGD project. The reservoir has all the properties you need to make SAGD work, no complications like top gas or bottom water or shale compartments, and this one can use a proven technology.”

He stresses that you shouldn’t “risk the company by using unproven technology. Let the big guys figure that stuff out. We know that SAGD will work. Reservoir thickness ranges from 15 metres to about 30 metres. It’s definitely SAGD-able.” Oil saturation in the reservoir ranges from 70-80 per cent with an average of 75 per cent, he says. The reservoir “is not as thick as some properties further south” like Suncor’s Firebag project. “However, it’s a great property.”

At the low point in the financial crisis, last year Lutes’ team prepared a SAGD proposal for submission to the ERCB. “We designed a 12,000 barrel per day project for two reasons. From a regulatory perspective, it’s the fastest way to get onstream. If you make a proposal for more than 12,600 barrels (2,000 cubic metres) per day, approval takes another year. That’s the first reason. The second is that if you develop a smaller project, you can use standard equipment. Other companies are using the same pots and pans as we’ll be using. That gives us better control of our capital costs, since that equipment is made locally. We don’t have to go to international manufacturers.”

As for expansion and timing, Lutes is characteristically optimistic. “We think we’ve got enough resource to expand. We have contingent resources, and we think we can grow our capacity up to the 36,000 barrel per day range” within two years of construction of the first project. “Our first project is going to be steaming up at the end of 2011, and on full production by 2013. We think we can expand to the east side of the McKay River and also expand the original project on the west side. We hope to have applications in by the middle of 2011. Based on our recent experience, the applications take about 14 months to process.”

The cost of the initial project will be about $428 million. For Phases 2 and 3, Lutes estimates $380 million. “The difference is that infrastructure costs for the next phases will be lower once we are in the area.” Southern Pacific will use cash flow from Senlac in Saskatchewan and from McKay to fund growth in other oilsands leases.

Longboarding
Outside the office, Lutes is both musical and athletic. He’s had an interest in rock music since he and some friends started up a rock band in high school: “I played bass and sang.” The guitar playing is something his three sons – Cory, 19, who is studying engineering at UBC; 11-year-old Kyle; 9-year-old Dylan – have all taken up.
His wife Kathy and he are heavily involved with soccer with the younger boys. Formerly an accountant with TransCanada, she is now a full-time mum and treasurer of her kids’ soccer club. I ask about hockey. “We absolutely love hockey. We watch it religiously but we don’t play it. The reason is that we have a genetic problem,” he deadpans. “We can’t turn right on skates.”

He can turn right on the longboard, however. Essentially a surfboard with wheels, these long skateboards can measure 1.5 metres in length, and good riders can perform complex tricks on them. “I took up longboarding this summer,” he says. “Longboards really cruise. My kids have them, and they are a lot of fun. I figure if the kids want to use them, I might as well go boarding with them. I play basketball with them, too.”

How do you sum up Byron Lutes? A guitar-playing businessman, a longboarding engineer, an executive hooked on rock concerts. Too bad he can’t turn right on his ice skates.

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Melting Away

Like the Wicked Witch of the West, Petro-Canada has met its demise, and few are around to mourn

An obituary of the company's rise and fall, this article appears in the November 2009 issue of Oilweek

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
About 20 years ago I wrote a speech for Bill Hopper, who was then chairman and CEO of Petro-Canada. He had just taken on a one-year term as chair of the Canadian Petroleum Association (the CPA; now CAPP), which I then worked for.

The process was strange beyond imagination. Instead of simply going to his office to find out what he wanted to say, I learned at the last minute that I was to go with an entourage: CPA president Ian Smyth; vice president Hans Maciej; and my boss, Norm Elliott. Among the other members of the CPA’s board of governors, Hopper alone demanded that amount of attention. The interview took place in Hopper’s palatial offices in Petro-Canada Centre. Not surprisingly, the interview was a flop – a waste of time for all concerned.

This vignette is a reasonable caricature of the early years for the most controversial petroleum company in Canadian history. Especially under Hopper’s leadership, Petro-Canada set the national standard for self-importance, arrogance and underperformance. Although the worst times are long behind us, the company’s epitaph cannot be written without reference to those bad old days. In some ways, they were with the company to the end.

For example, if you believe that markets are inherently rational, try graphing the company’s share price to those of its peers. Every large Canadian oil company has done better than the People’s Oil Company, as it was once unaffectionately known.

When the crash came a year ago, Petro-Canada collapsed more deeply than most. This left it vulnerable to regime change, which quickly came in the form of a takeover encouraged by complaints from a large shareholder, The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, which wanted to increase shareholder value.

The company and oilsands pioneer Suncor Energy soon announced a friendly merger, consummated on August 1st. The transaction created Canada’s largest oil and gas producer, with a market value of more than $50 billion. By the time the companies merged, Petro-Canada had nearly doubled in value from its 52-week share-price bottom, set last November. Clearly, the rational markets felt that with the takeover a better manager was in charge of its assets.

Few people will miss Petro-Canada the oil company. Its corporate history is a bit like the story line for “The Incredible Shrinking Man” – the 1957 movie in which protagonist Scott Carey, who had been contaminated by a radioactive cloud and pesticide, shrank slowly until he was reduced to living in a dollhouse.

In real, inflation-adjusted terms, Petro-Canada was the incredible shrinking company. Notwithstanding infusions of additional cash through equity sales, in real terms Petro-Canada’s market capitalization at the time of its merger with Suncor was less than the federal government’s original investment. In nominal terms (unadjusted for inflation), it lost nearly half the money its founding shareholder, the government of Canada, poured into its maw. And as the shackles of government ownership were slowly removed, it lost a combination of hard cash and opportunity for its second round of shareholders, a long-suffering gaggle of private investors.

The Background
Petro-Canada was founded as a Crown Corporation in 1975 by an act of Parliament and started operations the following year. The company was created upon noble ideals. In a period of intense energy insecurity, the left wing of Ottawa’s political establishment – the minority Liberals supported by the NDP as kingmakers – proclaimed the need for a national presence that would go boldly into the Canadian frontiers, which supposedly were being overlooked by the international players who then dominated Canada’s oil and gas sector. As importantly, the company would serve as a “window on the industry” through which policymakers could peer through clear glass. At start-up, the federal government transferred its 45 percent stake in Panarctic Oils and its 12 percent interest in Syncrude to the newly established company.

While the political issue of the day was ownership of Canadian resources – especially oil – Petro-Canada quickly went into acquisition mode by buying integrated companies rather than pure E and P operations. The idea was to wave the Canadian flag to consumers (aka voters) across the country. Outside Alberta, the political decision to create a national oil company was popular, and the company was given $1.5 billion in start-up money and easy access to new sources of capital.

During its first ten years, Petro-Canada purchased Atlantic Richfield Canada; Pacific Petroleums; Petrofina; most of BP’s Canadian refineries and service stations; and Gulf Canada’s retail and refining operations. The irony was not lost on the oil and gas sector: there were no shortages of refining capacity or retail operations, yet the company paid premium prices for assets which brought considerable liabilities with them. Other companies – BP and Gulf, for example – were selling them partly because the 1980s were a period of consolidation for retailing assets. The era of having a gas station on every corner was morphing into the present era of service stations only in heavy-traffic locations. And with service station closures came significant environmental liabilities, since product leakage from underground storage tanks was endemic across the country. That collective mess had to be cleaned up, and doing so was expensive.

The company did become an important purveyor of gasoline and motor oil at the service station, and one of its few unadorned successes was to develop the trusted and respected Petro-Canada brand of petroleum products. The single biggest boost to that brand came when the company sponsored the 1988 Olympic torch relay – a sponsorship that Ed Lakusta, at the time the company’s president, called the finest thing his company had ever done. Even sceptics began to believe Petro-Canada had a place in the oilpatch, and its gasoline sales soared.

Because of its many acquisitions in Western Canada, the company became one of the largest players in western Canada’s traditional oil fields, in the oilsands and in the east coast offshore. Did this lead to the discovery or development of more oil in the west? Certainly not. In 1927 John Bertram, an American Oil Company operative investigating the energy scene in Alberta, wrote a succinct description of what geologists now call the method of multiple working hypotheses.

“We know from our own experience,” he said, “that the geologists and also the officials of a company that operates in one area for a long time, tend to think along the same lines and to accept the same theories of oil occurrence. When other groups of men invade the same territory, the newcomers work with different methods, use different theories and drill structures the others condemned.” Through its acquisition of numerous companies on the government’s dime, Petro-Canada actually slowed oil development in western Canada – or so says the tried-and-true multiple working hypothesis method.

With the changing of the political winds, governments gradually began privatizing the company. Begun in 1991 under Brian Mulroney (who had ordered the company to act like a profit-driven company when he was first elected), this process was completed in 2004 by the Liberal government of Paul Martin, which sold more than 49 million shares for about $3 billion, bringing the government’s total recovery from its investment to $5.7 billion.

Petro-Canada acquired valuable offshore interests during the Hopper era. These included Hibernia, which is Canada’s most prolific ever oilfield. The company was the operator behind the Terra Nova discovery, which is now Canada’s second-largest offshore oilfield. Also in the offshore, Petro-Canada was the operator of the White Rose oilfield.

But the company did not truly begin operating like a profit-driven private company until 1993, when Hopper was replaced by Jim Stanford. During Stanford’s stewardship, the company made efforts to grow in important ways. Its east coast assets went on production, and the company went international, acquiring and developing in the North Sea, Libya, Syria and Trinidad and Tobago. At the end, those offshore and international operations were its biggest sources of income. After decades of rationalization, its refining and marketing operations – the second-largest in Canada – became a stable and reliable source of cash flow.

For investors, though, the bottom line is the bottom line, and Petro-Canada shares never performed close to the level you might expect from a company with its assets, image and cash flow. An important factor was the Petro-Canada Public Participation Act – Mulroney-era legislation dictating that no single entity can hold more than 20 percent of the company. This made the likelihood of a takeover remote, greatly weighing on Petro-Canada’s stock price. Call it the last curse of public ownership.

The Legacy and the Merger
The storied tale of Petro-Canada is an object lesson in the failures of government interference in the economy. Journalist Peter Foster’s 1992 book, Self Serve: How Petro-Canada Pumped Canadians Dry, won that year’s National Business Book Award and was a factor in unseating Bill Hopper.

At the end of a chilling chronology of hubris and mismanagement during the company’s first 15 years of operations Foster writes, “It can fairly be claimed that Canada is at least $10 billion deeper in debt because of Petrocan, a debt for which there is no corresponding asset. The money has gone….But although the original investment has been largely destroyed, the debt lives with us. We are like bad gamblers in debt to loan sharks, our obligations growing geometrically. The annual interest cost of the Petrocan-associated debt is about $1 billion, and all the income tax from 100,000 average Canadian families will have to go to pay that annual charge.”

According to another, highly hypothetical version of this analysis, Canada would be debt-free if, instead of spending $10 billion on petroleum assets during the high-interest-rate 70s and 80s, the federal government had instead reduced its debt by that amount. More to the point, the creation of Petro-Canada generated few if any useful results. To the extent the company contributed to the policies of the hated National Energy Program, it caused unnecessary and inestimable damage to the country and its oil industry.

Petro-Canada danced into the arms of Suncor with a tremendously deflated cash flow stream and dramatically lower profits after 2008’s oil-pricing bubble. During the company’s last quarter as an independent operator, its net earnings decreased by 95 percent to $77 million, compared with $1.5 billion a year earlier. The company cited the deadly combination of lower commodity prices and volumes plus higher costs and expenses. The recession-related collapse of oil and gas prices was clearly the most important source of this financial disaster.

Disaster that may have been, but for Suncor, with its high-cost oilsands production, the impact was far worse. In the second quarter the company suffered a net loss of $51 million, compared to net earnings of $829 million a year earlier. The financially weaker of the two companies – Suncor – was the acquisitor because of the strength of its management. The company, which at time of writing is trading at about $35 per share, started life in 1993 at about a buck. That’s serious growth – especially compared to Petro-Canada’s original $13 issue price, which had grown to only $41 at the time of the merger. Petro-Canada’s shareholders were a long-suffering breed.

Petro-Canada’s Jim Stanford and Suncor CEO Rick George first discussed merging in 1999, but the negotiations went nowhere. In the crisis atmosphere of the latest recession, though, the players were more motivated to get results. The announcement came less than two months after Petro-Canada’s big shareholder, The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, began agitating for better shareholder value.

At a stroke, the merger between the two companies created Canada’s largest oil company, and the fifth largest in North America. Post-merger, Suncor controls 26.5 billion barrels of oil; the largest suite of oil-sands holdings in the world; daily production of 680 million barrels of oil equivalent; and an international reach that embraces the North Sea, Libya, Syria, and Trinidad and Tobago. The joint Canadian operations of the merged company cover the energy sector, from the Arctic to the east coast offshore, shale gas, refineries and a vast chain of retail outlets. The gas stations and other marketing operations are the only visible remains of what was once Canada’s national energy company.

What is the effect on the new, combined company? The most immediate impact is greater operating efficiency. The designers of the merger – Rick George and Petro-Canada’s Ron Brenneman, Stanford’s successor – forecast that joining forces will save $300 million a year in operating costs and about $1 billion in annual capital spending by eliminating duplication of pipelines, power and water infrastructure for oil-sands operations. In addition, Petro-Canada’s light oil assets are far less vulnerable to another oil price collapse, and will thus stabilize the combined company’s cash flow stream. Also, Petro-Canada brought with it a suite of non-core overseas assets that the company can sell to finance its core oilsands developments, like the Firebag SAGD expansion that went on hold last year.

Professor of economics and academic director of the University of Calgary’s School of Policy Studies Robert Mansell says the deal makes sense in many ways. “In a world with great uncertainty, where we don’t know what is going to happen with climate change policy, it gives you an ability to mix and blend and do all kinds of things that you wouldn’t be able to do if you were just oil sands. Long term, if you can maintain a very efficient, integrated operation that is better than a very narrow, specialized operation. And when you are talking about billion-dollar projects, being a large company is a lot better than being a small company. I see that as being an excellent strength that they can build on.”

If the new company has an Achilles heel, perhaps it is a relic of the Petro-Canada years. As a result of the merger, Suncor is now subject to the Petro-Canada Public Participation Act, which weighed so heavily on Petro-Canada for so many years. That law, which restricts ownership in the company by any single entity to 20 percent, will protect Suncor from predation during the period of consolidation. Longer term, though, will the last curse of public ownership weigh on Suncor’s shares, as it once did on Petro-Canada’s?