Melting Away

Like the Wicked Witch of the West, Petro-Canada has met its demise, and few are around to mourn

An obituary of the company's rise and fall, this article appears in the November 2009 issue of Oilweek

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
About 20 years ago I wrote a speech for Bill Hopper, who was then chairman and CEO of Petro-Canada. He had just taken on a one-year term as chair of the Canadian Petroleum Association (the CPA; now CAPP), which I then worked for.

The process was strange beyond imagination. Instead of simply going to his office to find out what he wanted to say, I learned at the last minute that I was to go with an entourage: CPA president Ian Smyth; vice president Hans Maciej; and my boss, Norm Elliott. Among the other members of the CPA’s board of governors, Hopper alone demanded that amount of attention. The interview took place in Hopper’s palatial offices in Petro-Canada Centre. Not surprisingly, the interview was a flop – a waste of time for all concerned.

This vignette is a reasonable caricature of the early years for the most controversial petroleum company in Canadian history. Especially under Hopper’s leadership, Petro-Canada set the national standard for self-importance, arrogance and underperformance. Although the worst times are long behind us, the company’s epitaph cannot be written without reference to those bad old days. In some ways, they were with the company to the end.

For example, if you believe that markets are inherently rational, try graphing the company’s share price to those of its peers. Every large Canadian oil company has done better than the People’s Oil Company, as it was once unaffectionately known.

When the crash came a year ago, Petro-Canada collapsed more deeply than most. This left it vulnerable to regime change, which quickly came in the form of a takeover encouraged by complaints from a large shareholder, The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, which wanted to increase shareholder value.

The company and oilsands pioneer Suncor Energy soon announced a friendly merger, consummated on August 1st. The transaction created Canada’s largest oil and gas producer, with a market value of more than $50 billion. By the time the companies merged, Petro-Canada had nearly doubled in value from its 52-week share-price bottom, set last November. Clearly, the rational markets felt that with the takeover a better manager was in charge of its assets.

Few people will miss Petro-Canada the oil company. Its corporate history is a bit like the story line for “The Incredible Shrinking Man” – the 1957 movie in which protagonist Scott Carey, who had been contaminated by a radioactive cloud and pesticide, shrank slowly until he was reduced to living in a dollhouse.

In real, inflation-adjusted terms, Petro-Canada was the incredible shrinking company. Notwithstanding infusions of additional cash through equity sales, in real terms Petro-Canada’s market capitalization at the time of its merger with Suncor was less than the federal government’s original investment. In nominal terms (unadjusted for inflation), it lost nearly half the money its founding shareholder, the government of Canada, poured into its maw. And as the shackles of government ownership were slowly removed, it lost a combination of hard cash and opportunity for its second round of shareholders, a long-suffering gaggle of private investors.

The Background
Petro-Canada was founded as a Crown Corporation in 1975 by an act of Parliament and started operations the following year. The company was created upon noble ideals. In a period of intense energy insecurity, the left wing of Ottawa’s political establishment – the minority Liberals supported by the NDP as kingmakers – proclaimed the need for a national presence that would go boldly into the Canadian frontiers, which supposedly were being overlooked by the international players who then dominated Canada’s oil and gas sector. As importantly, the company would serve as a “window on the industry” through which policymakers could peer through clear glass. At start-up, the federal government transferred its 45 percent stake in Panarctic Oils and its 12 percent interest in Syncrude to the newly established company.

While the political issue of the day was ownership of Canadian resources – especially oil – Petro-Canada quickly went into acquisition mode by buying integrated companies rather than pure E and P operations. The idea was to wave the Canadian flag to consumers (aka voters) across the country. Outside Alberta, the political decision to create a national oil company was popular, and the company was given $1.5 billion in start-up money and easy access to new sources of capital.

During its first ten years, Petro-Canada purchased Atlantic Richfield Canada; Pacific Petroleums; Petrofina; most of BP’s Canadian refineries and service stations; and Gulf Canada’s retail and refining operations. The irony was not lost on the oil and gas sector: there were no shortages of refining capacity or retail operations, yet the company paid premium prices for assets which brought considerable liabilities with them. Other companies – BP and Gulf, for example – were selling them partly because the 1980s were a period of consolidation for retailing assets. The era of having a gas station on every corner was morphing into the present era of service stations only in heavy-traffic locations. And with service station closures came significant environmental liabilities, since product leakage from underground storage tanks was endemic across the country. That collective mess had to be cleaned up, and doing so was expensive.

The company did become an important purveyor of gasoline and motor oil at the service station, and one of its few unadorned successes was to develop the trusted and respected Petro-Canada brand of petroleum products. The single biggest boost to that brand came when the company sponsored the 1988 Olympic torch relay – a sponsorship that Ed Lakusta, at the time the company’s president, called the finest thing his company had ever done. Even sceptics began to believe Petro-Canada had a place in the oilpatch, and its gasoline sales soared.

Because of its many acquisitions in Western Canada, the company became one of the largest players in western Canada’s traditional oil fields, in the oilsands and in the east coast offshore. Did this lead to the discovery or development of more oil in the west? Certainly not. In 1927 John Bertram, an American Oil Company operative investigating the energy scene in Alberta, wrote a succinct description of what geologists now call the method of multiple working hypotheses.

“We know from our own experience,” he said, “that the geologists and also the officials of a company that operates in one area for a long time, tend to think along the same lines and to accept the same theories of oil occurrence. When other groups of men invade the same territory, the newcomers work with different methods, use different theories and drill structures the others condemned.” Through its acquisition of numerous companies on the government’s dime, Petro-Canada actually slowed oil development in western Canada – or so says the tried-and-true multiple working hypothesis method.

With the changing of the political winds, governments gradually began privatizing the company. Begun in 1991 under Brian Mulroney (who had ordered the company to act like a profit-driven company when he was first elected), this process was completed in 2004 by the Liberal government of Paul Martin, which sold more than 49 million shares for about $3 billion, bringing the government’s total recovery from its investment to $5.7 billion.

Petro-Canada acquired valuable offshore interests during the Hopper era. These included Hibernia, which is Canada’s most prolific ever oilfield. The company was the operator behind the Terra Nova discovery, which is now Canada’s second-largest offshore oilfield. Also in the offshore, Petro-Canada was the operator of the White Rose oilfield.

But the company did not truly begin operating like a profit-driven private company until 1993, when Hopper was replaced by Jim Stanford. During Stanford’s stewardship, the company made efforts to grow in important ways. Its east coast assets went on production, and the company went international, acquiring and developing in the North Sea, Libya, Syria and Trinidad and Tobago. At the end, those offshore and international operations were its biggest sources of income. After decades of rationalization, its refining and marketing operations – the second-largest in Canada – became a stable and reliable source of cash flow.

For investors, though, the bottom line is the bottom line, and Petro-Canada shares never performed close to the level you might expect from a company with its assets, image and cash flow. An important factor was the Petro-Canada Public Participation Act – Mulroney-era legislation dictating that no single entity can hold more than 20 percent of the company. This made the likelihood of a takeover remote, greatly weighing on Petro-Canada’s stock price. Call it the last curse of public ownership.

The Legacy and the Merger
The storied tale of Petro-Canada is an object lesson in the failures of government interference in the economy. Journalist Peter Foster’s 1992 book, Self Serve: How Petro-Canada Pumped Canadians Dry, won that year’s National Business Book Award and was a factor in unseating Bill Hopper.

At the end of a chilling chronology of hubris and mismanagement during the company’s first 15 years of operations Foster writes, “It can fairly be claimed that Canada is at least $10 billion deeper in debt because of Petrocan, a debt for which there is no corresponding asset. The money has gone….But although the original investment has been largely destroyed, the debt lives with us. We are like bad gamblers in debt to loan sharks, our obligations growing geometrically. The annual interest cost of the Petrocan-associated debt is about $1 billion, and all the income tax from 100,000 average Canadian families will have to go to pay that annual charge.”

According to another, highly hypothetical version of this analysis, Canada would be debt-free if, instead of spending $10 billion on petroleum assets during the high-interest-rate 70s and 80s, the federal government had instead reduced its debt by that amount. More to the point, the creation of Petro-Canada generated few if any useful results. To the extent the company contributed to the policies of the hated National Energy Program, it caused unnecessary and inestimable damage to the country and its oil industry.

Petro-Canada danced into the arms of Suncor with a tremendously deflated cash flow stream and dramatically lower profits after 2008’s oil-pricing bubble. During the company’s last quarter as an independent operator, its net earnings decreased by 95 percent to $77 million, compared with $1.5 billion a year earlier. The company cited the deadly combination of lower commodity prices and volumes plus higher costs and expenses. The recession-related collapse of oil and gas prices was clearly the most important source of this financial disaster.

Disaster that may have been, but for Suncor, with its high-cost oilsands production, the impact was far worse. In the second quarter the company suffered a net loss of $51 million, compared to net earnings of $829 million a year earlier. The financially weaker of the two companies – Suncor – was the acquisitor because of the strength of its management. The company, which at time of writing is trading at about $35 per share, started life in 1993 at about a buck. That’s serious growth – especially compared to Petro-Canada’s original $13 issue price, which had grown to only $41 at the time of the merger. Petro-Canada’s shareholders were a long-suffering breed.

Petro-Canada’s Jim Stanford and Suncor CEO Rick George first discussed merging in 1999, but the negotiations went nowhere. In the crisis atmosphere of the latest recession, though, the players were more motivated to get results. The announcement came less than two months after Petro-Canada’s big shareholder, The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, began agitating for better shareholder value.

At a stroke, the merger between the two companies created Canada’s largest oil company, and the fifth largest in North America. Post-merger, Suncor controls 26.5 billion barrels of oil; the largest suite of oil-sands holdings in the world; daily production of 680 million barrels of oil equivalent; and an international reach that embraces the North Sea, Libya, Syria, and Trinidad and Tobago. The joint Canadian operations of the merged company cover the energy sector, from the Arctic to the east coast offshore, shale gas, refineries and a vast chain of retail outlets. The gas stations and other marketing operations are the only visible remains of what was once Canada’s national energy company.

What is the effect on the new, combined company? The most immediate impact is greater operating efficiency. The designers of the merger – Rick George and Petro-Canada’s Ron Brenneman, Stanford’s successor – forecast that joining forces will save $300 million a year in operating costs and about $1 billion in annual capital spending by eliminating duplication of pipelines, power and water infrastructure for oil-sands operations. In addition, Petro-Canada’s light oil assets are far less vulnerable to another oil price collapse, and will thus stabilize the combined company’s cash flow stream. Also, Petro-Canada brought with it a suite of non-core overseas assets that the company can sell to finance its core oilsands developments, like the Firebag SAGD expansion that went on hold last year.

Professor of economics and academic director of the University of Calgary’s School of Policy Studies Robert Mansell says the deal makes sense in many ways. “In a world with great uncertainty, where we don’t know what is going to happen with climate change policy, it gives you an ability to mix and blend and do all kinds of things that you wouldn’t be able to do if you were just oil sands. Long term, if you can maintain a very efficient, integrated operation that is better than a very narrow, specialized operation. And when you are talking about billion-dollar projects, being a large company is a lot better than being a small company. I see that as being an excellent strength that they can build on.”

If the new company has an Achilles heel, perhaps it is a relic of the Petro-Canada years. As a result of the merger, Suncor is now subject to the Petro-Canada Public Participation Act, which weighed so heavily on Petro-Canada for so many years. That law, which restricts ownership in the company by any single entity to 20 percent, will protect Suncor from predation during the period of consolidation. Longer term, though, will the last curse of public ownership weigh on Suncor’s shares, as it once did on Petro-Canada’s?

Getting More for Less

Making a buck in North America’s most expensive gas basin. This article appears in the February 2009 issue of Oilweek.

By Peter McKenzie-Brown
North America’s natural gas business is going through fundamental change, but Alberta’s conventional gas sector isn’t well positioned to compete. As Canadian Natural Resources' president Steve Laut told a conference call when he was discussing his company’s deep cuts in capital spending for 2009. “We are drilling (for gas) in B.C. but cutting back in Alberta.

The oilsands can withstand (Alberta’s) higher royalties, and on the oil side, the government got it right, but they missed it on gas. Alberta is the worst place for gas development in North America, and likely the world.” Why are things so bad? Part of the problem is the province’s much-maligned new royalty regime, which sapped the industry’s motivation to invest in the province’s traditional source of supply, conventional gas. In November the province gave explorers the option to pay royalties at the old rate for four years, provided the wells were more than 1,000 metres deep and spudded after the New Year.

This eleventh-hour tinkering “will have an improvement on activity levels in the province,” according to Tristone Capital vice president Cristina Lopez, “but it will not improve the cash flow outlook for companies that are going into a difficult commodity-price environment.” That’s a major reason for the decline in conventional exploration and development. “There’s been a tendency to assume that as long as we have gas opportunities in Alberta, people will come here to invest their money to get it out,” said Dave Russum, who is head of geosciences at AJM Petroleum Consulting. “We should not automatically assume that will be the case. When you change the royalty system and make other such changes, then investors will go to other opportunities where they have other advantages – closer to markets, or where there’s a better royalty regime or a lower cost structure.”

He notes that until this year there has been an absolute correlation between wells drilled and gas prices: When prices went up, so did the number of wells. This year, prices went up but drilling in Alberta went down. Was this an unintended consequence of Alberta’s new royalty regime? Probably, but other economic factors are also at play. Geological targets are changing; costs and prices are fluctuating for reasons that have nothing to do with natural gas activity levels (think oilsands); new technologies are fundamentally changing the economics of development; and issues related to environmentally responsive, full-cost accounting are playing an increasingly important role in project approvals.

A Fourth Amigo...Again
Three Western countries – Norway, Canada and the Netherlands – are now self-sufficient in natural gas (the UK was among them until four years ago). Soon, another country could join that small but lucky band. If you were to hazard a guess, which country do you think might join that group? That country, whose conventional gas production peaked in 1972, began focusing on unconventional natural gas in the 1980s.

Today, the Lower 48 states are producing gas at rates near their 1972 peak. Increasing supplies from unconventional gas fields and coal-bed methane are outstripping by far the decline from conventional sources, and LNG production from Alaska is possible. A number of commentators have suggested that these factors could soon make the United States again self-sufficient. An obvious implication is that Canada must develop alternative markets to help create price security.

According to Russum, only six percent of the sedimentary rock in the Western Canada Basin is prospective for conventional natural gas. However, the bulk of the other rocks are prospective for biogenic gas, tight gas, fractured gas or shale gas. Coal bed methane represents a tiny additional wedge on his pie. This gas-prone basin, where conventional gas production is in decline, still hosts huge volumes of undeveloped hydrocarbons.That’s a point worth remembering.

The cost of developing and delivering Western Canada’s gas varies greatly from region to region, but the WCSB is still one of the world’s most expensive onshore basins to develop. A recently released National Energy Board map illustrated the geographical diversity in cost related to developing and producing these gas supplies. The average cost of gas supplies ranges from $11.18 per thousand cubic feet in the BC Foothills to $6.58 per thousand in the adjacent Alberta Deep Basin. For gas producers and analysts, the critical factor in the NEB analysis was that gas prices need to average $7.88 per thousand cubic feet for producers to generate a risked after-tax rate of return of 15% in this basin.

 Given an average Alberta spot price for natural gas around $6 during 2007, the report intoned, “the average economics for new gas development in western Canada were marginal.... These results are consistent with the general impressions expressed by industry players about the tight economics of new gas....”

 Costs and Prices
If the economics are as bad as this NEB report suggests, why is a fair amount of gas exploration even taking place? According to University of Calgary economics professor Robert Mansell, “It depends on your outlook on prices. If you look into the future and you see average prices in the future at $12, say, then you want to establish a position in that play. Even if you think gas prices will never go above $8, you may want to establish reserves at today’s costs. You could sell them to people who have expectations of higher prices.” It’s all about price and cost.

 Even though unconventional gas is more expensive to develop than conventional production, that’s where about 60% of natural gas activity is going. Like the US, which made great progress developing unconventional gas during an era of lower prices, Western Canada is developing these resources in a period of price/cost disequilibrium – that is, lower prices and higher costs.

This is counterintuitive. In classical economics, adversity in the gas industry – the lower margins and riskier business environment of the last few years, for example – would force the industry to drive down costs and increase efficiency. The U of C’s Mansell squelched that assumption, first zeroing in on the dynamic relationship between price and cost. “Costs drive prices,” he said, “but prices also drive costs.” Supply costs go up and down depending on activity levels, rig and services availability, materials, labour, technology, changes in well productivity, changing drilling targets, and changing fiscal and tax regimes.

Crown land prices go up and down as well. The main way the recent downturn would force the gas industry to become more efficient, said Mansell, would be through consolidation. “In this environment, there’s likely to be much more rationalization.” As smaller companies combine into larger ones, they generally become more efficient.

Technology
While companies employ cost-cutting measures (shutting in higher-cost gas supplies during tough times, for example), Mansell makes the case that real efficiencies are more likely to arise in periods of relative prosperity than in periods of economic adversity. “In a tight margin environment, would companies put more R&D and technology into increasing efficiency? It’s not clear. They actually have more free cash to play with in a higher price environment (and are therefore in a better position to increase efficiency). However, if a company is financially healthy, it can even increase profits in a low-cost environment by applying new technologies.” In other words, greater efficiency in the petroleum sector comes mostly from technology –improved drilling, seismic and other technologies used in exploration and development – along with the obvious benefits of such capital infrastructure as plant and pipeline.

According to Mansell, “It’s a dynamic environment. Mostly because of better know-how, over longer periods of time the industry is getting 1.5% to 2% more output per unit of input each year.” How is that happening? AJM’s Dave Russum puts a technical slant on things. “Per well costs are higher than in the past, that’s true. However, we now understand that in certain kinds of gas resources we can greatly increase productivity by increasing drilling density in lower-quality gas reserves. You need to be able to fracture the maximum amount of the reservoir.” So important has this trend become that it is contributing directly to the reduced number of wells being drilled in Canada. This year, nearly 40% of the wells drilled in Canada will involve horizontal or directional drilling – twice the level of ten years ago.

For the first time, First Energy Capital said in a recent research note, the number of horizontal wells will match the number directionally drilled, and more and more of well costs are in completion technology. Fracturing consists of injecting a fluid into a well to cracks or fractures already present in the formation and create new ones. Russum is especially keen on combining and the use of multi-stage fracturing techniques prior to completion of horizontal wells. “Between the heel and the toe of a horizontal well,” he says, “you can isolate an interval close to the toe, frack that region, then move back towards the heel, isolate another interval and do another frack. This breaks up a lot of rock, and makes a lot more gas available. These new technologies are enabling us to access a whole lot more low-permeability rock than you would ever be able to reach with a vertical well.”

As the U of C’s Mansell points out, “Current costs may not reflect future costs. As you learn more about the resource, costs could come down substantially – not only the cost of production, but also the cost of finding new reserves.” Recent innovations in fracking wells illustrate how this can happen. Companies have made great strides in increasing the number of fracks they can make in a single horizontal well. Horizontal wells drilled into shale reservoirs now average eight fracks each – an astonishing improvement from only ten years ago, but one that is causing potential bottlenecks in the system.

According to Kevin Lo of FirstEnergy Capital, to fracture just one of the Horn River shale gas wells in north-eastern BC, you need a fracturing crew equipped with more than 30,000 horsepower of compression. To put that in perspective, in Western Canada perhaps 800,000 horsepower is available. “We do not believe that there will be sufficient capacity to perform all of the jobs necessary, should (BC’s Horn River and Montney shale gas) plays grow,” he said in a research note. He also worried about the logistics of bringing in enough propping agent: fracturing a single horizontal well in these reservoirs can require up to two thousand tonnes of sand.

Stewardship
Another area where big changes are happening, of course, is in environmental practice and policy. Take the case of EnCana’s application to drill in the Suffield National Wildlife Area, where a hearing began last September. The gas at Suffield is shallow, biogenically-derived gas in mixed sand and shale sequences. Since it is not generated in the same temperature and pressure systems that create conventional hydrocarbons, shallow biogenic gas is an unconventional variety. The Milk River and Medicine Hat sands of south-eastern Alberta and south-western Saskatchewan are classic examples of this type of unconventional gas. This was the first gas produced in western Canada. It is continuously gas-producing, and it is the largest gas-producing region in the WCSB.

For efficient production of biogenic gas in this area you need close well spacing, and you generally can’t use horizontal drilling because the wells are so shallow. Developing production in these fields is almost like assembly-line manufacturing. You haul in a small rig on a system that causes minimal surface disturbance, drill and complete the well in a day. You can use nitrogen and CO2 fracks, which reduce environmental damage in really shallow wells. Then other crews come along, install the wellhead and tie production in to a pipeline.

Sounds pretty green, doesn’t it? Not according to the Alberta Wilderness Association’s Joyce Hildebrand. “Extracting resources is only one of the mandates of the government, whether at the provincial or federal level,” she says. “Another mandate given to the government by citizens of Canada and Alberta is to set aside environmentally significant areas so that they are off-limits to human activities, such as oil and gas exploration, that may compromise their natural values; to preserve species that have been designated as endangered, threatened or otherwise at risk, and to preserve the habitat that those species depend on.”

She adds, “The evidence is overwhelming that doubling the number of wells, and constructing the necessary associated infrastructure such as pipelines and roads, in the Suffield NWA will seriously compromise the habitat of (species at risk). If the habitat goes, the species go. So as a society, we need to decide whether we want to sacrifice the conservation of that endangered prairie ecosystem for the acceleration of the resources under the ground. Those two choices are incompatible – it’s one or the other. There is no possibility here of ‘balancing’ the two….The sooner we begin to work on a macroeconomic policy that is based on something other than the well-funded rhetoric that economic growth and conservation of wilderness is compatible, the better. The situation at Suffield is one example where that needs to be challenged.”

The issues are complex, and the ERCB has a long history of listening carefully to all sides and dealing with these situations fairly. However, this is only right. As the U of C’s Mansell explains, economic theory supports the environmentalists’ point of view. “In theory,” he says, “you want to be as close as possible to full-cost and-full benefit accounting from a social point of view. Policy decisions should incorporate all incremental benefits and the incremental costs – including costs and benefits that don’t necessarily show up in the market. How you estimate that isn’t an easy question to answer, but your accounting should be based on a benefit-cost analysis.”

Since a poll by the provincial government found that only 16% of Albertans believe the province does a good job of looking after the environment, this story has legs. So there you have it. Alberta may be “the worst place for gas development in North America.” However, the WCSB remains an important gas basin, and activity throughout the region is helping illustrate gathering industrial trends. On the policy side, issues related to full-cost accounting will likely take years to iron out – but at least they are being heard.